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Monetary incentives, such as matching subsidies, are widely used in traditional fund-
raising and crowdfunding platforms to boost funding activities and improve funding out-
comes. However, its effectiveness on prosocial fundraising is still unclear from both theo-
retical (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Frey, 1997; Meier, 2007a) and empirical studies (Ariely 
et al., 2009; Karlan and List, 2007; Rondeau and List, 2008).  This dissertation aims to 
examine the effectiveness of matching subsidies on prosocial fundraising in the crowd-
funding context. Specifically, I study how the presence of matching subsidies affects over-
all funding outcomes and funding dynamics in the online prosocial crowdfunding environ-
ment.  
The first essay utilizes a quasi-experiment on a prosocial crowdfunding platform to 
examine the effectiveness of matching subsidies, in which third-party institutions provide 
a dollar-for-dollar match of private contributions on selected campaigns, on funding out-
comes, and lender behavior. Although matching subsidies offer matched loans competitive 
advantages over unmatched loans, we find that the total private contributions to both 
matched and unmatched loans increase compared to their pre-matching counterparts, sug-
gesting a positive spillover effect on unmatched loans. However, matching subsidies lead 





intertemporal displacement effect on existing loans.  Furthermore, we find matching sub-
sidies effectively attract previously inactive lenders to contribute to matched loans, leading 
to a motivational crowding-out effect on active lenders to unmatched loans. These findings 
shed new light on the overall effectiveness of matching subsidies on the online crowdfund-
ing platforms. These findings provide policy support to offer matching subsidies on proso-
cial crowdfunding websites to increase overall funding.   
The second essay examines how matching subsidies affect the dynamics of prosocial 
crowdfunding, driven by herding behavior and payoff externalities. First, in contrast to the 
previous literature documenting that prior contributions may crowd out subsequent contri-
butions in prosocial crowdfunding, we find that both herding behavior and positive payoff 
externalities exist, which suggests that higher cumulative contributions lead to an increase 
in the subsequent funding amount. Second, we identify the existence of the bystander effect, 
where the positive effect of prior contributions drops sharply when the campaign is close 
to success. Finally, we find a substitution effect between matching subsidies and prior cu-
mulative contributions. Matching subsidies not only increase private contributions but also 
moderate the herding behavior and payoff externalities. Our findings shed new light on the 
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Prosocial fundraising, the process of gathering voluntary financial contributions from 
individuals, enables non-profit organizations to provide public goods and charity to indi-
viduals living in poverty. The development of information technology has dramatically 
transformed traditional prosocial fundraising. A new form of fundraising ─the prosocial 
crowdfunding on the Internet─ has received a great deal of attention in the Information 
Systems field (Gomber et al., 2018). As of 2017, fundraisers have received up to $410 
billion in the United States, where $31 billion is collected from online fundraising (Non-
profit Source 2018).  
With the increasing popularity of prosocial fundraising, monetary incentives, a com-
mon strategy of offering financial rewards for prosocial behavior, have been widely used 
in both offline and online communities to facilitate prosocial fundraising. The effect of 
monetary incentives stems from the economic theory of prosocial behavior on the relative 
benefit and cost. The more expensive prosocial behavior is, the less it should be under-
taken; the more benefit prosocial behavior brings, the more it will be undertaken (Meier 
2007). Consequently, financial rewards can be provided to either reduce the relative cost 
or increase the benefit of prosocial behavior. In prosocial funding, there are mainly two 
mechanisms of monetary incentives- rebate and matching subsidy. The rebate mechanism 
is often implemented with a tax deduction to reduce the relative cost, while the matching 
subsidy mechanism is usually provided by third-party foundations to multiply the impact 
of private contributions. These monetary incentives increase the utility of making prosocial 
funding by reducing the cost of funding or increasing benefit, which affects both the fund-





Nevertheless, the overall effectiveness of monetary incentives on prosocial funding is 
still unclear in both theoretical and empirical studies. From the theoretical perspective, rel-
ative price theory suggests that providing monetary incentives increases funding by reduc-
ing its cost, while the crowding-out effect demonstrates that monetary incentives dampen 
the fundraising by decreasing intrinsic motivation (Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Frey 1997; 
Meier 2007a). The empirical evidence of the effectiveness of monetary incentives on pro-
social fundraising is also mixed (Ariely et a., 2009; Karlan and List, 2007; Rondeau and 
List, 2008).  
To contribute to a clearer understanding of the effects, we use the setting of prosocial 
crowdfunding platforms to study how matching subsidies, as one of the most popular mon-
etary incentives whereby third-party institutions provide a dollar-for-dollar match of the 
private contributions from individuals on selected campaigns, affect prosocial fundraising. 
We collect the transaction-level data from Kiva, one of the largest prosocial crowdfunding 
platforms in the world, to examine the overall and dynamic effectiveness of matching sub-
sidies on funding behavior. Kiva enables crowds to lend to projects directly, providing 
alternative and supplement finance for small entrepreneurs who lack access to traditional 
finance. Although lenders in Kiva lend the money to fundraisers, they do not receive any 
interest from the loan, making Kiva a leading prosocial crowdfunding platform. 
In recent years, the matching subsidy, because of its success in traditional fundraising 
to attract funders and boost funding, has been increasingly used by many online crowd-
funding platforms, such as Kiva, Kickstarter, and Donorchoose.org. However, the ambigu-
ity of monetary incentives' effectiveness on prosocial funding raises the concern of provid-





found mixed evidence of the effectiveness of matching subsidies on selected campaigns 
after excluding the matching grants (Karlan and List 2007; Karlan et al. 2011; Rondeau 
and List 2008). Additionally, matching subsidies may shift the contribution to other un-
incentivized campaigns to incentive campaigns, leading to a negative spillover effect on 
campaigns that do not receive matching subsidies but solicit funds simultaneously (Deck 
and Murphy, 2019).  
The literature that examines the effectiveness of matching subsidies on crowdfunding 
is still scarce. The crowdfunding market differs from the traditional funding market be-
cause of its easy access and great uncertainty. Without a financial intermediary, it is diffi-
cult for individual funders to determine a fundraiser’s creditworthiness, reducing the fun-
ders' willingness to invest. In addition, thousands of campaigns in crowdfunding platforms 
solicit for funds simultaneously, making it necessary to consider the spillover effect of 
matching subsidies. The significant difference between crowdfunding and the traditional 
funding market calls for research on the overall effectiveness of matching subsidies on the 
new form of prosocial fundraising.  
Essay 1 examines how the presence of matching subsidies affects funding activity in 
the prosocial crowdfunding context. In this essay, we first aggregated the transaction-level 
data into loan-daily panel data to analyze how matching subsidies affect loans' funding 
outcome. By analyzing the loan-daily panel data from Kiva, we find that matching subsi-
dies increase the private contributions to matched projects by attracting a larger pool of 
funders and have positive spillover effects on unmatched projects (projects that don’t re-





contributions and the higher total private contributions from more contributors to un-
matched projects. However, matching subsidies decrease the average contribution to 
matched campaigns and result in a negative effect when matching subsidies cease. Sec-
ondly, we use the transaction-level data to explore the underlying mechanism behind the 
effect of matching subsidies on funding outcomes in the transaction-level analysis. By an-
alyzing the transaction-level data, we reveal that matching subsidies affect the funding out-
comes of matched and unmatched projects by influencing funders' preferences and behav-
ior.  
Essay 1 provides evidence of the overall positive effect of matching subsidies on both 
incentivized campaigns and un-incentivized campaigns soliciting for funds simultane-
ously, which support the usage of matching subsidies on crowdfunding platforms. I am 
also interested in studying how the effect of matching subsidies on funding activities varies 
in the dynamic crowdfunding environment. On crowdfunding platforms, funders face sig-
nificant risk and uncertainty due to the lack of intermediaries. Consequently, funders rely 
on other funders’ funding behavior on the platform, such as accumulated prior contribu-
tions, the total number of prior contributors, and the percentage of goal attainment, to make 
funding decisions. Matching subsidies accelerate the funding activities by doubling fun-
ders' contributions, which affect the dynamics of crowdfunding.  
Essay 2 examines how matching subsidies affect crowdfunding dynamics using the 
aggregated loan-daily level panel data. The essay focuses on herding behavior (Banerjee 
1992) and payoff externalities (Ayres and Kneese, 1969; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The 
herding behavior stems from the information asymmetry between funders and fundraisers, 





learn and make decisions. The reason is that individuals believe that other funders may 
have some private information on the quality of a project, which leads to herding behavior, 
where individuals refer to others’ decisions and are more likely to fund campaigns with 
more other supporters. The payoff externalities in crowdfunding occur if the payoff of a 
funder’s contribution to a campaign depends on other funders’ funding behavior. Most 
crowdfunding platforms employ the all-or-nothing model, where the fundraisers receive 
nothing until the targeted amount is achieved. Consequently, funders can only receive the 
payoff from their contribution if the campaign's total funding amount contributed from 
other funders reach the target.  
Essay 2 identifies that higher cumulative contributions and percentage of goal attain-
ment lead to an increase in the subsequent funding amount in crowdfunding, which pro-
vides evidence of herding behavior and payoff externalities. However, the positive effect 
of prior contributions drops sharply when the campaign is close to success. We further find 
a substitution effect between matching subsidies and prior accumulative contributions. We 
find that matching subsidies moderate herding behavior and payoff externalities. The re-
sults in essay 2 suggest that matching subsidies are most effective in the early stage of 
funding, which is useful for crowdfunding platforms to design an effective promotion strat-
egy of matching subsidies.   
This dissertation provides both theoretical and managerial contributions. The disserta-
tion contributes to the crowdfunding literature (Burtch et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2012; Sinanan, 
2009) by demonstrating the positive effects of monetary incentives on prosocial lending. 
This dissertation extends the crowdfunding literature by showing that the monetary incen-





studying how non-pecuniary factors such as the race of fundraisers, friendship, and social 
media help increase funding. This dissertation demonstrates that monetary incentives can 
have an overall positive effect on both incentivized campaigns and un-incentivized cam-
paigns soliciting.  
This dissertation contributes more broadly to the economics literature about monetary 
incentives' overall effectiveness on prosocial behavior. Extensive literature using labora-
tory or field experiments demonstrates that monetary incentives may crowd out prosocial 
behavior or lead to strong competition effect – reducing contributions to un-incentivized 
campaigns (Karlan and List, 2007; Karlan et al., 2011; Rondeau and List, 2008; Deck and 
Murphy 2019). This dissertation provides empirical evidence that monetary incentives pos-
itively affect both incentivized campaigns and their competitors in prosocial lending, sug-
gesting the overall positive effect of monetary incentives. Additionally, compared with 
most prior studies that focus on campaign level analysis, the transaction level analysis in 
this dissertation reveals the underlying mechanism that drives the prosocial funding out-
comes. 
Finally, in addition to the overall effectiveness of monetary incentives on prosocial 
funding, this dissertation demonstrates that the effect of monetary incentives decays with 
the increasing percentage of goal attainment and accumulative contribution. Better under-
standing the crowd-funding dynamics provides new managerial insights about the most 







Chapter 2. An Examination of the Effectiveness of Matching Subsidies 
on Prosocial Crowdfunding 
2.1 Introduction 
Online crowdfunding and microfinance have become an increasingly important tool 
to help small entrepreneurs get alternative access to capital, alleviate poverty, and improve 
social welfare in recent years (Gomper 2018). The global transaction value of crowdfund-
ing has reached nearly $305 billion in 2019 (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Fi-
nance2020). Despite the popularity of crowdfunding platforms, many campaigns still have 
difficulty in getting sufficient funding (Zhao et al., 2017). To address this issue, many plat-
forms such as Kiva, Kickstarter, and Donorchoose.org provide monetary incentives to at-
tract funders and increase their contributions. The most popular monetary incentive is the 
matching subsidies, whereby third-party institutions provide a dollar-for-dollar match of 
the private contributions from individual funders on selected campaigns. Based on a recent 
survey of more than 300 of the world’s largest companies, at least 92% of companies had 
offered at least one matching subsidy, and about 285.6 million funds were contributed 
through matching subsidies, accounting for 12% of total corporate cash contributions to 
nonprofits (CECP Coalition 2018). 
Existing literature has provided competing theories on the effectiveness of matching 
subsidies on matched projects. On the one hand, matching subsidies make private contri-
butions (contributions of funders excluding the matching grants) highly rewarding. Com-
pared with campaigns without matching subsidies, individual lenders can double their im-
pact on fundraising of matched campaigns with the same amount of contribution or achieve 





volume and intensity of activity increase when it is essentially cheaper to pursue (Andreoni 
2006). Additionally, providing matching subsidies to a campaign may signal high quality 
to funders, increasing the contributions to the campaign. On the other hand, matching sub-
sidies have a crowding-out effect on private contributions by reducing donors’ intrinsic 
motivation (Andreoni, 1990; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).  Given the opposing theo-
retical perspectives, Karlan and List (2007) and Rondeau and List (2008) found that match-
ing subsidies increase the private contribution, while Karlan et al. (2011) found no signif-
icant effect.  
Additionally, matching subsidies may affect the funding of unmatched projects both 
during the matching subsidy event and after the event is over. There are two competing 
theories to predict the effect of matching subsidies on unmatched competing projects. The 
first theory states that private contributions may shift from unmatched campaigns to 
matched ones during the matching program, resulting in a spatial displacement effect. In 
contrast, an alternative theory argues for a positive effect of matching subsidies on un-
matched loans (Charness and Holder, 2018; Deck and Murphy, 2019; Eckel and Grossman, 
2017; Karlan and List, 2007; Huck et al., 2015; Meier, 2007b; Scharf et al., 2017). The 
rationale is that matching subsidies bring positive spillover effects for unmatched loans 
soliciting for funds simultaneously, resulting in an increased number of contributing lend-
ers and total private contributions to unmatched loans during the event compared to the 
pre-event levels. When matching subsidies cease, the in-creased private contributions dur-
ing the matching event may reduce funding after the event, leading to an intertemporal 
displacement effect (Meier 2007b; Scharf et al. 2017). 





crowding-out effect and displacement effect have raised concerns about the overall effec-
tiveness of the matching subsidies on fundraising. Second, the matching subsidy, an effec-
tive monetary incentive to improve funding outcomes, has not received much attention in 
the crowdfunding literature. Most of the existing literature focuses on traditional prosocial 
funding, such as donations and charitable giving. The online crowdfunding platforms differ 
from traditional fundraising in several ways: the scale of the matching subsidies is much 
larger than traditional fundraising; the duration of the program is significantly shortened 
from the traditional several weeks to several days; information is more transparent online 
than in traditional channels. The large-scale and high-intensity nature of the subsidies may 
lead to different impacts on funding outcomes and lending behavior on the crowdfunding 
platforms. The available information online also makes it possible to trace the lenders’ 
lending history and lending patterns. This provides us with both rich data and a unique 
opportunity to uncover the underlying driving forces that explain the observed outcomes, 
enhancing our understanding of the overall effectiveness of matching subsidies on the 
crowdfunding platforms.   
In this essay, we utilize a quasi-experiment of an exogenous event on a prosocial 
crowdfunding platform to examine the effects of matching subsidies on funding outcomes 
and lender behavior. During the event, some loans are selected to receive matching subsi-
dies based on loan characteristics. The matched loans are selected according to certain 
characteristics, instead of random assignment, which makes the event become a quasi-ex-
periment (Cook and Campbell 1979). Specifically, we address the following research ques-





loans during the event, respectively? How do matching subsidies affect private contribu-
tions on the platform after the event? What are the effects of matching subsidies on lenders’ 
behavior at the individual level?  
To answer these research questions, we leverage the “flash match” event (Kiva 2018) 
launched by Kiva, one of the largest prosocial crowdfunding platforms across the world, 
on September 12, 2018. During the “flash match” event, Kiva partnered with some gener-
ous anonymous lenders or third party foundation, such as Google, Women and Girls Em-
powered Foundation, and Bank of America to provide one-for-one matching funds to thou-
sands of selected loans on Kiva. Additionally, Kiva and volunteer funders share the infor-
mation of these matched loans in social media and online communities, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube, and Kiva Forum, to attract potential lenders1. We collected two weeks 
of transaction-level data from September 3, 2018, to September 16, 2018, that covers the 
“flash match” event, as well as information on all loans and lenders. Using the comprehen-
sive data set and the quasi-experiment, we explore the effectiveness of matching subsidies 
on both funding outcomes of loans and lenders’ funding behavior.  
At the loan level, we find that matching subsidies have a positive effect on matched 
loans. Both the number of contributing lenders and total private contribution to matched 
loans increase, consistent with previous findings (Karlan and List, 2007; Huck et al., 2015; 
Eckel and Grossman, 2017; Charness and Holder, 2018). We further find matching subsi-
dies bring positive spillover effects for unmatched loans soliciting for funds simultane-
ously, resulting in an increased number of contributing lenders and total private contribu-
tion to unmatched loans during the event compared to the pre-event levels. This contrasts 
 






with the spatial displacement effect (Scharf et al., 2017).  In addition, for active loans on 
the platform after the event, we find evidence of intertemporal displacement. When the 
“flash match” event is over, open loans on the platform are, on average, less likely to re-
ceive any funding.  
Given the ubiquitous presence of matching subsidies in crowdfunding, it is important 
to understand how the lenders’ behavior drives the funding outcomes of loans. At the indi-
vidual lender level, we find that matching subsidies make lenders more likely to lend, lead-
ing to a higher number of lenders contributing to loans. In particular, matched loans attract 
more previously inactive lenders. However, the average contribution per lender of matched 
loans decreases compared with their pre-matching counterparts, supporting the crowding-
out effect of matching subsidies on individual lenders’ average contribution per matched 
loan. At the same time, unmatched loans attract more active lenders with a higher average 
contribution per lender. In contrast to inactive lenders who are mainly attracted to matched 
loans due to one-for-one matching, active lenders are less influenced by the matching sub-
sidies, showing different patterns of behavior change by the matching subsidies. All these 
findings provide new insights into the effectiveness of matching subsidies on the online 
prosocial crowdfunding platforms. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief review of 
related literature. Section 2.3 describes the study context and data. Section 2.4 provides a 
loan-level analysis of our empirical model. Section 2.5 presents the transaction-level anal-
ysis and results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the essay.  
 





2.2.1 Crowdfunding and Online Microfinance 
With the rapid development of information technology, many online crowdfunding 
platforms emerge as alternative finance channels (Galak 2011). Crowdfunding platforms 
enable small entrepreneurs who lack access to traditional financing tools to get funding 
from a large pool of individual investors. Agrawal et al. (2014) classify crowdfunding plat-
forms as four types: equity-based, reward-based, loan-based, and donation-based. Our re-
search setting is based on an online microfinance (Morduch 1999) platform, which is the 
combination of loan-based crowdfunding and donation-based crowdfunding, where lend-
ers lend money to small entrepreneurs without interest. Contributors on the microfinance 
platforms may get their principals back within certain periods but earn zero interest from 
lending, making their contributions prosocial lending. 
Crowdfunding and online microfinance platforms have become increasingly popular, 
but many campaigns on these platforms still suffer from a lack of support from funders 
(Massolution, 2015). The reason is that funders and fundraisers have asymmetric infor-
mation on the quality of a campaign, which hinders funders from supporting the campaign.  
To address the challenge, previous studies have investigated a number of campaign 
factors that influence the funding outcomes, including personal narrative and social entre-
preneurship of borrowers (Sinanan 2009), provision points (Burtch et al. 2018), crisis 
shocks (Yang et al. 2016), race of borrowers (Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2017), and 
friendship networks of borrowers (Lin et al. 2013). Furthermore, from the lenders’ per-
spective, herding behavior (Zhang and Liu 2012), cultural difference and geographic dif-





than 2016), the social network structure of advocating individuals (Hong et al. 2018), de-
sign of team communities (Chen et al. 2017), as well as characteristics of lenders (Liu et 
al. 2012) would influence their campaign preferences.  
Although these prior findings provide important insights into the platform design to 
improve funding outcomes, the literature about how matching subsidies affect crowdfund-
ing and online microfinance is relatively scarce. The following subsection will introduce 
the relevant work on the effect of matching subsidies on traditional donation and crowd-
funding. 
2.2.2 Matching Subsidies 
Matching subsidies have been widely provided in traditional fundraising and prosocial 
crowdfunding, but the effectiveness of matching subsidies is still unclear. From the theory 
of relative price, making a one-for-one matching is equivalent to reducing the price of do-
nation by half, which can significantly increase the response rate for donation solicitation 
(Chen et al. 2006; Frey 2017; Meier 2007a; Meier 2007b; Karlan and List 2007). Except 
for the price effect, donors will view matching subsidy as a signal of quality, which will 
also increase the response rate and donation amount (Heutel 2014). On the other hand, 
matching subsidies may impose a negative effect of crowding out the donation of private 
donors after excluding the matching grants (Andreoni 1990). From the motivational crowd-
ing-out theory, monetary incentives, including matching subsidies, have detrimental effects 
on intrinsic motivation, which may decrease the individual contribution (Bénabou and 
Tirole 2006; Frey 1997; Meier 2007a).   
There is mixed empirical evidence about the effects of matching subsidies on private 





matching subsidies increase the private contribution of individual funders (Eckel and 
Grossman 2003; Eckel and Grossman 2008; Eckel and Crossman 2017; Gneezy et al. 2014; 
Huck et al. 2015; Karlan and List 2007), although Karlan et al. (2011) found that matching 
subsidies have no significant effect on the private contribution. Rondeau and List (2008) 
found matching subsidies significantly decrease private contributions.  
The effects of matching subsidies on unmatched loans are also unclear. Scharf et al. 
(2017) and Deck and Murphy (2019) identified spatial displacement between matched 
campaigns and unmatched campaigns soliciting for funds simultaneously. They found that 
matching subsidies would exacerbate competition, leading to a shift of donation from un-
matched projects to matched campaigns, increasing the contribution to matched cam-
paigns, and decreasing the contribution amount of unmatched campaigns. Using lab exper-
iments, Krieg and Samek (2017) found slightly positive spillover effects of matching sub-
sidies on unmatched campaigns.  Based on the daily aggregated data from an online mi-
crofinance platform Donorchoose.org, Meer (2017) found empirical evidence that match-
ing subsidies increased giving to eligible requests without crowding out giving to similar 
others, either contemporaneously or overtime. However, Meier (2007b) found inter-
temporal displacement – matching subsidies increase the contribution amount in the short 
run, but the contribution amount decreases after the program.   
To understand how funders’ behavior is affected by the matching subsidies program, 
Eckel and Grossman (2008) found that continuing funders (i.e., funders who make regular 
contributions) decrease their contribution to matched campaigns, while lapsed (i.e., funders 
who contribute occasionally) and prospect funders (i.e., funders who have not contributed) 





induce funders to consider other similar campaigns, generating new giving to unmatched 
loans. Different from these prior studies, we find that matching subsidies attract previously 
inactive lenders to contribute to matched loans, and active lenders tend to shift their con-
tribution to unmatched loans. These findings provide new insights into the overall effec-
tiveness of matching subsidies on crowdfunding platforms. 
 
2.3. Research Context and Data Description 
2.3.1 Research Context 
Our research context is Kiva.org, the world’s largest online peer-to-peer lending plat-
form. It has raised $1.37 billion in funds for more than 3.4 million borrowers from 1.8 
million lenders since its inception in October 2005. It is an online microfinance (Morduch 
1999) platform for the poor, unbanked, and underserved. Most loans on Kiva are donation-
based with a 0% interest rate for the borrowers who, by and large, are located in developing 
countries. Kiva collaborates with local microfinance institutions (MFI) to screen potential 
borrowers and select eligible ones. Local MFI then assists eligible borrowers in creating 
their profiles, including the borrower’s biography, loan amount, repayment schedule, and 
loan purpose (Burtch et al. 2014). After the profiles are posted on Kiva, potential lenders 
around the world can provide funds in $25 increments. The fundraising for these loans 
follows the “all or nothing” model, where the borrowers receive nothing until the targeted 
loan amount is achieved. That is, the full loan amount must be raised within the fundraising 
period in order for funds to be sent to the borrowers; otherwise, the loan will expire, and 
any funds raised will be returned to the lenders. 





anonymous supporter or third-party foundations, such as Google, Women, and Girls Em-
powered Foundation, and Bank of America, to provide matching subsidies for selected 
loans. Under this program, the matching partner defines the criteria about which loans 
should be matched, and the qualified loans will then be displayed with an x2 badge and the 
partner’s name. If any lender makes contributions to matched loans, the matching partners 
will lend the same amount to these loans. With these programs, approximately 94.7% of 
loans get fully funded on Kiva. This success rate is much higher than that of other prosocial 
crowdfunding platforms such as Donorchoose.org (68.3%), Kickstarter (43%), and Indie-
gogo (less than 10%) (Massolution 2015; Meer 2017). From time to time, Kiva organizes 
Match Day events, whereby a large number of loans are matched on one day, to attract 
more lenders and contribution.  
2.3.2 Quasi-Experiment Setting and Data Collection 
Our study utilizes one of the “flash match” events on Kiva as a quasi-experiment to 
examine the impacts of such programs on funding outcomes of both matched and un-
matched loans. On 12 September 2018, Kiva launched the “flash match” event. Through 
this event, one million dollars matching grants were provided for approximately two-thou-
sand loans. Figure 2.1 presents how daily aggregated lending activities change before and 
after the event.  
As shown in Figure 2.1a, the number of new loans does not change on the match day 
compared to the days before the event, whereas the number of active loans decreases sig-
nificantly after the match day, suggesting that more loans are fully funded because of the 
event. According to Figure 2.1b, the number of matched loans on the match day is more 





funded fully on the matched day, and the rest are no longer matched after the event day. 
More than 4000 active loans on the event day are unmatched. The total daily contribution 
amount from lenders increases considerably on the match day and the day after, as shown 
in Figure 2.1c. Figure 2.1d shows a jump in total contribution to matched loans on the event 
day and an increase in contribution to unmatched loans on the day after the event.  
Figure 2.1. Daily Aggregated Loan and Lender Level Data 
 
Note : (a) Total number of new loans and active loans; (b) Total number of active matched and unmatched 
loans; figure (c) Total contribution amount to all active loans;  (d) Total contribution amount to all active 
matched and unmatched loans. The x-axis represents the dates.  The black vertical line indicates the match 
day (September  12, 2018) 
To examine the influence of the “flash match” event on September 12, I collect gran-
ular transaction-level data on funding activities on Kiva from September 3 to 16, 20182. 
 
2 We only select data from 3 September 2018 to 16 September 2018.  The matching subsidy is one of the 





The data contains detailed information for each lending activity, such as the lender, the 
borrower, the lending amount, and the timestamp. Our final dataset consists of 49,031 lend-
ing actions from September 3-16, 2018, taken by 24,404 lenders on 6,246 loans. Among 
the 6,246 loans, 1994 are matched loans. These 1994 loans are matched by 15 third-party 
institutions or lenders, who have different specific matching preferences. The preference 
of different matching funds providers is presented in Table A1. 
At the loan level, we also have data on the funding outcomes of these sample loans, 
such as total funds raised, time taken to be fully funded, number of lenders, average con-
tribution amount per lender, etc.  At the lender level, each observation includes the lender’s 
contribution amount and the number of loans funded. This unique dataset allows us to an-
alyze the impacts of the event from the perspectives of both loan outcome and lender ac-
tivities.  
2.3.3 Key Variables and Summary Statistics 
Key variables are defined in Table 2.1, and summary statistics are shown in Table 2.2. 
Nowt, Post1t, and Post2t are time dummies for September 12 (the event day), September 
13, and September 14 to 163. There are 1,994 matched loans in the Now period, 204 of 
which remain matched in the Post1 period. In the Post2 period, all loans are unmatched. 
Using the three time dummies, we split the quasi-experiment period into four phases: be-
fore the event, during the event, one day after the event, and two days after the event. This 
 
can receive tax deductions from the matching behavior. Consequently, Kiva also launches a matching event 
on 17 September 2018.  Hence, we select the transactions before 17 September 2018 to eliminate the influ-
ence of other matching events. 
3 In this research, we explore the effect of matching subsidies on matched loans and unmatched loans. Con-
sequently, we split the time window into four time periods according to the number of active matched loans 
each day. Before the event, there are almost no matched loans. After the event day, the number of active 
matched loans on September 12 and September 13 is significantly higher than that on subsequent days. 
Therefore, we decide to split the time window after the event day into three time periods: September 12 (the 





allows us to study the temporary treatment effects of the matching subsidies over time. As 
some matched loans became unmatched after the event day, we can use this reversal to 
study the effect of treatment removal, in addition to the treatment effect.  
Table 2.1: Definition of Key Variables 
TYPE VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Time Dum-
mies 
Now Binary indicator for the event day, September 12, 2018 
Post1 Binary indicator for the day after the event, September 13, 2018 
Post2 Binary indicator for the period of September 14-16, 2018  
Loan-Daily 
Level 
LendArrRatejt Number of lenders who lent to loan j on day t 
AvgContrjt Average contribution amount per lender for loan j on day t.  
FundAmountjt Funding amount loan j received on day t 
Matchjt 1 if  loan j is matched on day t, and 0 otherwise 
Competitionjt Number of other active loans for loan j on day t 
AcuumAmountjt Funding amount that loan j had raised at the beginning of day t 
Transaction 
Level 
Lendij 1 if lender i lend to loan j, and 0 otherwise 
LendAmountij  Lending amount from lender i to loan j 
Matchij 1 if loan j is matched when lender i lend to it 
Activei 1 for active lender i, and 0 otherwise 
AccuAmountij Funding amount that loan j had raised before lender i lend to loan j 
Competitionij Number of other active loans when lender i lend to loan j 
 
To examine how the loan level funding outcomes are affected by matching subsidies, 
we first construct a loan-daily level panel data. The loans posted after the event or fully 
funded before the event were dropped to avoid the systematic difference between these 
loans and the loans active both before and after the event (Geva et al. 2019). Three variables 
measuring the funding outcomes are our dependent variables. First, LendArrRatejt is used 
to examine whether matching subsidies attract more lenders for a loan. Second, we are 
interested in how matching subsidies affect AveContrjt, the average contribution per lender, 
which is also referred to as the intensive margin (Epperson and Reif 2017). Finally, Fun-
dAmountjt, the product of LendArrRatejt and AveContrjt, is used to measure the overall ef-
fect on the total funding amount. The main independent variable is Matchjt, the treatment 
indicator for matched loans. Competitionjt and AccumAmountjt are used to control the im-





Liu 2012; Burtch et al. 2013).  
We are also interested in exploring how matching affects lenders’ choice of loans at 
the transaction level. To model the lender’s choice of loans, we use the dummy variable 
Lendij to indicate lender i's decision of lending to loan j. The lenders’ lending decisions 
where Lendij equals 1 were directly observed. However, the lenders’ not lending decisions 
where Lendij equals 0 are not observed directly but rather assumed on all the other active 
loans, under the “potential dyads” approach (Liu et al. 2015; Lin and Viswanathan 2016). 
It is impossible to include all the potential lender-loan dyads given the number of sample 
lenders and loans. It is unrealistic to assume a lender would evaluate all active loans before 
taking any lending action either. Therefore, we randomly sample two active loans without 
lending actions for each lender out of all the potential dyads, with active defined as still 
receiving lending when the lender makes a lending action. As a result, for each lender i 
who took any lending action at time t, three dyads are constructed, one for the lent loan and 
two for the not-lend loans. For two dyads for not-lend loans, both Lendij and LendAmountij 
are 0.  Overall, the dyadic data contains 309092 observations from 43175 lenders to 12333 
loans.  
Moreover, we examine the heterogeneity of lenders. Eckel and Grossman (2008), 
showing that active contributors are less responsive to the incentive programs such as 
matching subsidies. According to the number of loans they have lent before the event day 
(PreLendi), we define active lenders (Activei=1) as those with higher than median PreLendi 
(i.e., PreLendi >14), and the rest as inactive lenders (Activei=0).  Similar to the loan level 
analysis, AccumAmountij and TotalCompij are used to control for the herding effect (Zhang 






Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES OBS MIN MAX MEAN SD 
LendArrRatejt 67227 0 757 0.79 4.84 
AveContrjt 67227 0 2825 7.02 28.59 
FundAmountjt 67227 0 29075 27.91 187.69 
Matchjt 67227 0 1 0.03 0.17 
Competitionjt 67227 1 519 109.5 119.77 
AcuumAmountjt 67227 0 77600 109.5 741.1 
Lendij 309092 0 1 0.33 0.47 
LendAmountij  309092 25 5750 33.98 73.95 
Matchij 309092 0 1 0.09 0.28 
Activei 309092 0 1 0.39 0.49 
AccumAmountij 309092 0 81275 708.3 3843.74 
TotalCompij 309092 1 488 85.77 108.18 
 
2.4. Loan-Level Analysis  
2.4.1 Empirical Model 
At the loan level, we use the generalized difference-in-differences (DID) estimation 
combined with propensity score matching (PSM) and zero-inflated models to estimate the 
impacts of matching subsidies on loan outcomes. The DID estimation identifies the treat-
ment effect by comparing the difference of the treated group before and after the treatment 
with that of the control group (Card and Krueger 2000). The conventional DID model con-
siders only two periods, before and after the treatment. This method is suitable for the 
context where the treated group remains treated once the treatment starts.  However, in our 
research setting, some matched loans reverted to be unmatched after the event day.  So 
instead of the two-period DID model, we use the generalized DID model where the treat-
ment status can change more flexibly over time (Bertrand et al. 2004; Hansen 2007; Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2009). Thus, we use the following specification: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑗𝑡  +  ∅𝑿𝒋𝒕 + 𝜇𝑗 +  𝑤𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗𝑡                           (2.1)                 





LendArrRate, AveContr, and FundAmount. Matchjt is the treatment indicator. 𝜇𝑗  and 𝑤𝑡  
are loan and time-specific effects, respectively. For time-specific effects, in particular, we 
use three time period dummies of Nowt, Post1t, and Post2t instead of daily dummies. Xjt is 
the control variables, including Competition and AccumAmount.  
However, the DID model is valid only when the treatment and control groups follow 
parallel time trends. This assumption may not be reasonable if the matched and unmatched 
loans are fundamentally different because of the non-random selection of matched loans. 
To address this issue, we use PSM to construct a control group of unmatched loans that 
resemble the matched loans in all observables except for the treatment condition (Dehejia 
and Wahba 2002). As presented in Table A1, the third-party institutions select the matched 
loans based on the following loan characteristics: LoanAmount, which measures the target 
amount of the loan; RepayTerm represents the number of months over which the borrower 
will repay the loan; IsGroup is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if the loan has more 
than one borrower; IsFemale is a binary variable, which equal to 1 if the borrower of the 
loan is female; Country4  is the country of that loan; Sector5  represents the sector of that 
loan. 
Using these loan characteristics, we estimate a logit model for a loan to be selected for 
matching subsidies and calculate the propensity scores. Then for each matched loan, an 
unmatched loan is identified using the PSM algorithm of the nearest neighbor and without 
replacement. The propensity scores matching procedure generate a sample consist of 1,425 
control loans for the 1,425 matched loans. The balanced check of propensity matching is 
 
4 There are borrowers from 74 countries that publish their projects and raise funding.  Most of these coun-
tries are developing countries in Africa, Asia, and South America. 
5 There are 15 sectors of projects in Kiva: Construction, Clothing, Education, Agriculture, Food, Services, 





presented in Table 2.3. 
As a rule of thumb, the standardized mean deviation (SMD) of variables between 
matched and unmatched loans should be no larger than 0.2, and preferably 0.1 if the 
matched data is balanced (Austin 2009; Rosenbaum 2010). From the result of after match-
ing balance check, most of the SMD is smaller than 0.1, and only the SMD of Country is 
0.17. The result indicates that loans in the treated group and the control group are balanced. 
The distribution of propensity scores presented in Figure A1 also shows that the matching 
procedure produces balanced samples. Finally, we create a sample containing 29381 loan-
daily observations involving these selected 2850 loans for further analysis. 





 CTRL TREAT SMD CTRL TREAT SMD 
Count 4252 1994  1425 1425  
LoanAmount (Log) 6.52 6.58 0.08 6.55 6.61 0.07 
RepayTerm 15.81 16.07 0.05 16.00 16.07 0.01 
IsGroup 0.1 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.02 
IsFemale 0.59 0.76 0.37 0.66 0.68 0.06 
Country NA NA 0.96 NA NA 0.17 
Sector NA NA 0.36 NA NA 0.1 
Note: The Treat column presents the mean of variables for loans receiving matching subsidies. 
The Ctrl column presents the mean of variables for loans without receiving matching subsi-
dies. The standardized mean deviation (SMD) is widely used in literature to measure the bal-
ance of variables between treated groups and control groups. 
 
For the matched and unmatched loans selected by PSM, we use zero-inflated models 
to estimate the effect of the matching subsidies for two reasons. First, our dependent vari-
ables of funding outcomes such as funding amount and number of lenders are all non-
negative variables. Second, according to Table 2, they are also over-dispersed with many 
zero observations. In fact, only 20% of observations have non-zero funding outcomes. The 





zeros. It assumes that the positive values are generated according to a non-negative distri-
bution, and the excess zeros are generated by a separate inflation process of a binary dis-
tribution. The separate data generation process for excess zeros is appropriate in our con-
text, as the zero funding or lenders for many loans can be due to either lenders’ no-lending 
decisions after consideration or not being considered by lenders at all. A zero-inflated 
model can be specified as:   
                     𝐏r(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖) = {
∅ + (1 − ∅)𝑓(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝜃)                   𝑦𝑖  =  0
(1 − ∅) 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝜃)                                   𝑦𝑖  >  0
          (2.2) 
In Equation 2.2, Yi is the outcome variable.  is the probability of the zero value in the 
logit distribution. f is the distribution function for the positive values, and  is the vector of 
parameters of the distribution function f. Because LendArrRate and FundAmount are count 
data, we use the negative binomial distribution function for f and thus the zero-inflated 
negative binomial (ZINB) models. As AveContr is continuous, we use the truncated Gauss-
ian distribution function for f and thus the zero-inflated Gaussian model. 
2.4.2 Estimation Results 
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.4.  Since all three dependent variables 
have the same occurrence pattern of zeros, the estimation results of their inflation process 
are the same, shown in column (1) and estimated using a logit model with the dependent 
variable being one for zero observations. For ease of interpretation, we present all coeffi-
cients in column (1) in log odds ratios (Bland and Altman 2000), the relative probability 
of receiving zero funding. According to column (1), the odds ratio of zero funding for 
matched loans versus unmatched loans is 2.1% (=exp (-3.88)). That is, compared to un-
matched loans, matched loans are extremely unlikely to receive zero funding, suggesting 





Table 2.4. Loan Daily Level Estimation of Zero Inflated Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LOGIT NEG BINOMIAL 
VARIABLE  LENDARRRATE AVECONTR FUNDAMOUNT 
Match -3.88***(0.17) 1.35***(0.08) -0.05**(0.02) 0.84***(0.05) 
Now 0.01(0.09) 0.57***(0.08) 0.09***(0.02) 0.35***(0.05) 
Post1 -0.68***(0.07) 1.54***(0.06) 0.01(0.01) 0.93***(0.04) 
Post2 0.88***(0.05) 0.51***(0.07) -0.01(0.01) 0.3***(0.04) 
AccuAmount -0.92***(0.02) 0.11***(0.02) 0.06***(0) 0.14***(0.01) 
#Competition 0.09***(0.02) -0.08***(0.02) 0.02***(0) -0.03***(0.01) 
Loan Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y 
#Observation 29,381 29,381 29,381 29,381 
Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses6. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10    
 
The coefficients of the three time dummies show how matching subsidies affect all 
loans after controlling the match indicator for the three periods compared to the period 
before the event. From column (1), The coefficient of Now is insignificant, indicating that 
matching subsidies have no significant influence on the probability of being considered by 
potential lenders for unmatched loans on the match day. However, on the next day after 
the event, unmatched loans are more likely to be considered by potential lenders, showing 
from the positive and significant coefficient of Post1. Finally, the positive and significant 
sign of Post2 demonstrates that active loans are less likely to be considered by potential 
lenders when the matching subsidies ceased, providing evidence of intertemporal displace-
ment – loans are less likely to receive funding when the matching subsidy is over. The 
existence of intertemporal displacement may be explained by the shift of timing of lending. 
Potential lenders who plan to make contributions to unmatched loans after the event may 
decide to contribute to matched loans during the event, which makes these unmatched loans 
less likely to receive funding after the event. 
 
6 The zero-inflated model with the fixed effect is estimated with maximum likelihood estimation, instead of 
least squared estimation. The maximum likelihood estimation does not provide clustered standard errors. 





Column (2)-(4) presents the estimation results for the non-zero outcomes of the three 
dependent variables. The coefficient estimates of Match show that conditional on being 
considered by lenders, matched loans receive total funding from more lenders than un-
matched loans. This finding is consistent with the intuition that receiving matching subsi-
dies makes the matched loans more attractive for lenders. However, as shown in column 
(3), an average lender would contribute 5% less to a matched loan compared to his contri-
bution amount to an unmatched loan. This finding supports the crowding-out effect of 
matching subsidies that the average private contribution decreases while contributions 
from other sources increases (Adena and Huck 2017; Bekkers 2015; Rondeau and List 
2008). 
Our result demonstrates that the relative price effect dominates the crowd out effect in 
the crowdfunding context, which leads to a higher total contribution amount per day to 
matched loans. The total contribution amount of a loan is the multiplication of the number 
of lenders and the average contribution per lender. The relative price effect suggests that 
the reduced price of contribution increases the total contribution by attracting more lenders, 
while the crowd out effect suggests that matching subsidies reduce the total contribution 
by decreasing the average contribution. In the previous literature that uses laboratory ex-
periments to study the effect of matching subsidies, the number of contributors usually 
does not increase too much due to the limited potential contributors. However, on the 
crowdfunding platforms, millions of potential lenders have easy access to information 
about matching subsidies. The existence of social media and discussion forums also help 
spread the information to more potential lenders. Consequently, matching subsidies on the 





matching subsidies not only significantly increase the probability of receiving funding from 
any lender but also increase the number of contributing lenders by 285%. While crowd out 
effect only reduces 5% average contribution per lender.  
The coefficients of Now are significant and positive in columns (2)-(4), suggesting that 
unmatched loans receive funding from more lenders, higher funding amount per lender, 
and higher total contribution. In total, the contribution amount to unmatched loans in-
creases by 46% on the match day. In general, although matching subsidies are provided for 
matched loans only, such subsidies also benefit unmatched loans. Our results support pos-
itive spillover effects instead of spatial displacement effect (Scharf et al. 2017) of the match 
day event for unmatched loans.  
Our estimation results support the existence of the temporary positive spillover effect 
instead of the spatial displacement effect in the crowdfunding context. The reason may be 
that most of the crowdfunding platforms, including Kiva, follow the “all or nothing” model, 
also known as the provision point mechanism (Burtch et al., 2018). Under this model, a 
fundraiser can only receive funds pledged to the campaign if it reaches the predetermined 
target before the deadline. Otherwise, the funds will be returned to contributors, incurring 
opportunity costs. Consequently, the potential contributors cannot always lend to matched 
loans. As matched loans receive full funding speedily and get closed, potential lenders can 
only lend to unmatched loans, leading to higher contributing lenders to unmatched loans 
(positive spillover effect).   
The coefficients of Post1 and Post2 are significant and positive for the number of 





ing more lenders for unmatched loans is also relatively persistent. The insignificant coef-
ficients of Post1 and Post2 for average contribution per lender suggest that the effect on 
motivating more contribution from a lender is only temporary. Therefore, our results indi-
cate that the event had a persistent effect on promoting the platform and attracting more 
lenders to the platform, but only a temporary effect on changing lender behavior.     
The coefficients of the control variables are mostly as expected. AccuAmount has a 
significant and positive coefficient in column (2)-(4), consistent with the herding effect 
that loans with higher accumulated funding receive more contributions from more lenders 
(Zhang and Liu 2012). The coefficient of Competition is negative and significant in col-
umns (2) and (4), indicating that competition across loans reduces lenders and total funding 
for each loan.  
2.4.3. Robustness Check 
Our choice of zero-inflated model is appropriate for the data set. The calculated over-
dispersion ratio from the negative binomial model with the dependent variables 
LendArrRate and FundAmount are 1.75 and 9.25, respectively, which suggests overdisper-
sion of the count dependent variables. Besides, we use the Vuong closeness test (Vuong 
1989) to check whether the zero-inflated model is preferred by the negative binomial 
model. According to the Vuong test statistics calculated, 24.81(p<0.01) for LendArrRate 
as the dependent variable and 60 (p<0.01) for FundAmount as the dependent variable, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the two models are equally close respectively. Consequently, 
the zero-inflated model is preferred.  
We also conduct robustness checks using the negative binomial model with the de-





positive contribution with the dependent variable AveContr. The estimation results are pre-
sented in Table 2.5. We find that the matching subsidies increase the number of contrib-
uting lenders and total contribution amount to matched loans, as well as decrease the aver-
age contribution to matched loans. Besides, the matching gift programs have positive spill-
over effects for unmatched loans, and the positive effect disappears when the matching 
grants ceased. These results are consistent with those from zero-inflated model estimation. 










Match 1.00***(0.04) -0.05**(0.02) 1.23***(0.04) 
Now 0.46***(0.04) 0.07***(0.02) 0.28***(0.04) 
Post1 0.92***(0.03) 0.03(0.02) 0.55***(0.03) 
Post2 -0.11***(0.03) 0.02(0.02) -0.51***(0.03) 
AccuAmount 0.53***(0.01) 0.06***(0.01) 0.66***(0.01) 
#Competition -0.1***(0.02) 0.09***(0.03) -0.11***(0.01) 
Fixed-Effect Y Y Y 
#Observation 34,000 10,027 34,000 
Adjusted R2           0.01  
Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. In column (1), the dependent variable is the lender 
arrival rate. Since the variable is count variable and overdispersion, we use the negative binomial 
model to make the estimation. In column (2), the dependent variable is the average contribution per 
lender conditional on positive contribution. Since the variable is a continuous variable and highly 
skewed, we use the log-transformed OLS model to make the estimation. In column (3), the dependent 
variable is the total contribution amount. Since the variable is count variable and overdispersion, we 
use the negative binomial model to make the estimation. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10    
 
 As presented in Table A1, the matching grant during the event is provided by dif-
ferent third-party lenders or institutions. There is a concern that the specific institution may 
have a brand-ing effect (Chapleo 2015) – the brand of an institution may express a quality 
signal and affect the funding outcomes. From Table A1, we see that the anonymous sup-
porters provide matching subsidies to 1112 loans among the 1994 matched loans. Conse-
quently, we believe that the branding effect is not strong since more than half of the loans 





issue, we split the main independent variable Match into multiple dummy variables based 
on the matching grant’s provider of a campaign: Anonym (Anonymous Supporters), 
WAGE (Women and Girls Empowered Foundation), BOA (Bank of America), MillerFam 
(Miller Family Foundation), and WoodsFam (Woods Family Foundation). Using the new 
dummy variables, we test whether the branding effect ex-ists by replicating estimation in 
Table 2.5. The estimation results of the branding effects are presented in Table 2.6.  










BOA 0.9***(0.11) -0.05(0.05) 1.37***(0.12) 
MillerFam 0.77***(0.13) -0.12**(0.05) 1.2***(0.15) 
WoodsFam 1***(0.11) -0.11**(0.05) 1.05***(0.12) 
WAGE 1.43***(0.13) 0.04(0.05) 1.42***(0.11) 
Anonym 1.07***(0.06) -0.06**(0.03) 1.37***(0.06) 
Now 0.31***(0.05) 0.06**(0.03) 0.18***(0.05) 
Post1 0.83***(0.04) 0.001(0.02) 0.61***(0.04) 
Post2 -0.2***(0.04) -0.003(0.02) -0.5***(0.04) 
AccuAmount 0.59***(0.01) 0.06***(0.01) 0.7***(0.01) 
#Competition -0.11***(0.02) 0.06*(0.03) -0.1***(0.01) 
Fixed-Effect Yes Yes Yes 
#Observation   23,686 6,948   23,686 
Adjusted R2           0.01  
Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. In column (1), the dependent variable is the lender 
arrival rate. Since the variable is count variable and overdispersion, we use the negative binomial 
model to make the estimation. In column (2), the dependent variable is the average contribution per 
lender conditional on positive contribution. Since the variable is a continuous variable and highly 
skewed, we use the log-transformed OLS model to make the estimation. In column (3), the dependent 
variable is the total contribution amount. Since the variable is count variable and overdispersion, we 
use the negative binomial model to make the estimation. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10    
 
 The main results in Table 2.6 are consistent with those in Table 2.5. From the results 
in column (1) and (3), the five dummy variables of matching providers all have a positive 
and significant sign, which shows that matching subsidies with different matching provid-
ers all increase the number of funders and total contributions. The test of coefficients shows 





different in columns (1)-(3). However, the coefficient of WAGE is significantly larger than 
other dummy variables of matching grants’ providers, which indicates that campaigns 
matched by Women and Girls Empowered Foundation attract more potential lenders with 
higher total private contributions. The results indicate the branding may strengthen the ef-
fect of matching subsidies. However, we don’t find a strong branding effect since most of 
the matching providers bring a similar effect on funding outcomes. 
 
2.5 Lender-Level Analysis 
The impacts of matching subsidies on the funding outcomes of loans provide an un-
derstanding of lender behavior change at the aggregate level without considering lender 
heterogeneity (Andreoni and Miller 2002). Previous research has found that matching sub-
sidies have different effects on different types of lenders (Beckkers 2015; Eckel and Gross-
man 2008; Karlan and List 2007; Meier 2007a).  As matching subsidies serve as additional 
incentives for lenders, they are likely to be more effective for the lenders who have lower 
incentives to contribute without the program. That is, more prosocial lenders who have 
sufficient self-motivation may be less likely to change their lending behavior because of 
the matching subsidies. In this section, we further explore how the lenders are affected by 
the program differently. We differentiate two types of lenders according to the activity 
level of the lender prior to the event (PreLendi). We define active lenders as those whose 
PreLendi is greater than the sample median, and the rest as inactive lenders. Among our 
sample lenders, besides more frequent contributions, active lenders also have a higher av-






2.5.1. Empirical Model 
We use a logit model specification with fixed effects for lender i’s funding decision of 
loan j. The probability of lender i funding to loan j is modeled as follows:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝜹𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒕 +
𝜽𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒕 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  ∅𝑿𝒊𝒋 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗             (2.3) 
In Equation 2.3, Matchij is used to capture the effect of matching subsidies on lending 
decisions, Activeij is the binary indicator for active lenders, Activeij*Matchij captures the 
differential impact of matching subsidies on active lenders. Timet is the vector including 
the three time dummy variables Nowt, Post1t, and Post2t, where t refers to the day when 
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 is decided.  Timet *Activeij is used to examine how the three time periods affect 
active lenders’ lending decisions for both matched and unmatched loans, compared to in-
active lenders. Xij contains control variables including competition and accumulated fund-
ing amount. j is the loan fixed effects, capturing the impacts of time-invariant loan char-
acteristics. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the error term. Similarly, the (log-transformed) funding amount 
from lender i to loan j can be modeled as: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 
𝜹𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒕 + 𝜽𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒕 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  ∅𝑿𝒊𝒋 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2.4) 
2.5.2. Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the lender-level models are presented in Table 2.7. Column 
(1) shows the results of the logit estimation for the binary lending decision, while column 
(2) shows the results of the linear estimation for funding amount. According to the coeffi-





matched loans than unmatched loans, consistent with our results from the loan-level anal-
ysis. The positive and significant coefficients of Active in both columns confirm that active 
lenders are not only more likely to contribute but also make higher contributions on aver-
age. The coefficients of Now and Post1 are positive and significant in column (1) but neg-
ative in column (2), indicating that inactive lenders are more likely to contribute but con-
tribute less during the event, although such changes are temporary, according to the insig-
nificant coefficients of Post2. The coefficients of control variables are consistent with those 
from the loan-level estimation. 







Match 0.47***(0.01) -0.05***(0.01) 
Active 0.01***(0.004) 0.02**(0.01) 
Match*Active -0.04***(0.01) -0.05***(0.01) 
Now 0.09***(0.01) -0.01(0.01) 
Post1 0.21***(0.01) -0.06***(0.01) 
Post2 -0.002(0.01) 0.02(0.02) 
Now*Active 0.06***(0.01) 0.03***(0.01) 
Post1*Active 0.02**(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 
Post2*Active 0.05***(0.01) -0.05**(0.02) 
AccuAmount 0.07***(0.005) 0.05***(0.004) 
#Competition -0.11***(0.01) 0.06***(0.02) 
Loan Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R2 0.349 0.005 
#Observation 102,079  49,013 
Note: Model (1) is estimated with the linear probability model with fixed effect. Model (2) is 
estimated with a fixed model with the log form dependent variable. Robust Standard errors are 
provided in parentheses. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10    
 
We are most interested in the coefficients of the interaction terms. The negative and 
significant coefficients of Match*Active in both columns suggest that, compared to inactive 
lenders, active lenders are less likely to fund matched loans, and they contribute to matched 
loans with a lower amount. The positive and significant coefficients of Now*Active and 





fund unmatched loans, and they contribute to unmatched loans with a higher amount on 
the event day and the day after the event. These results imply that active lenders are indeed 
less affected by the event. Compared to inactive lenders who are motivated to fund matched 
loans, active lenders fund more unmatched loans with higher contributions but decrease 
their contributions to matched loans.  Our finding supports the motivational crowding-out 
theory by confirming that extrinsic monetary incentives reduce intrinsic motivation, espe-
cially for more prosocial individuals. According to the coefficients of Post2*Active, the 
active lenders’ inclination of selecting unmatched loans is persistent throughout the post-
event period, whereas their contribution amount to unmatched loans lowers to less than 
that of inactive lenders shortly after the event.   
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Matching subsidies have been widely used by online crowdfunding platforms to boost 
funding. Using a quasi-experiment on a prosocial crowdfunding platform Kiva, we exam-
ine the effectiveness of matching subsidies on the funding outcomes and lender behavior. 
We find that matching subsidies have an overall positive effect on all campaigns on the 
crowdfunding platform. This is consistent with previous research that monetary incentives 
can increase the total prosocial contributions to campaigns (Lacetera et al., 2014). How-
ever, in contrast to most previous studies that documented a positive effect on matched 
campaigns but a negative effect on unmatched ones, we find that matching subsidies posi-
tively affect both matched and unmatched loans. Although matched loans are more likely 
to receive private contributions than unmatched loans, the competition effect is dominated 





In addition, we find that matching subsidies negatively affect fundraising after the 
event, suggesting an intertemporal displacement effect – loans are less likely to receive any 
funding when the matching event is over. Large scale, short duration, and high intensity of 
the online matching subsidies distinguish them from traditional ones. We find the effect of 
matching subsidies is strong on the event day, but the effect is only temporary – lenders 
tend to shift their contributions to the event day, leading to decreased funding activities 
after the event. Similar to traditional matching subsidies, this finding suggests a short-term, 
time-shifting effect of matching subsidies on online fundraising.  
We find that the matching subsidies attract a large number of contributing lenders, 
most of them are previously inactive lenders. These lenders are mostly interested in con-
tributing to matched loans, crowding out some active lenders who then shift their contri-
butions to unmatched loans. In addition, we find that the average contribution per lender 
per matched loan decreases compared with their pre-matching counterparts, suggesting a 
detrimental effect of matching subsidies on lenders’ intrinsic motivation of contribution. 
At the same time, unmatched loans receive a higher average contribution per lender per 
loan than their pre-matching counterparts. This is mainly due to active lenders who have 
higher remaining funding after contributing to matched loans shifting their contributions 
to unmatched loans. Compared with inactive lenders who are mainly attracted to matched 
projects due to one-for-one matching, active lenders are less influenced by matching sub-
sidies, showing different patterns of behavior change induced by the monetary incentives. 
Overall, our research provides several practical implications on the use of matching 
subsidies on crowdfunding platforms. First, different from traditional matching subsidies 





on crowdfunding platforms have positive effects on both matched and unmatched loans. 
This alleviates the concerns about the negative effect of matching subsidies on unmatched 
loans and thus supports the use of monetary incentives to boost fundraising. Second, our 
analysis of lender behavior reveals different contribution preferences. We find the match-
ing subsidies effectively induce previously inactive lenders to become active and be willing 
to contribute. These findings suggest that the online crowdfunding platform could fre-
quently offer matching subsidies as an effective mechanism to awaken inactive lenders to 
become active on the platform. Finally, due to the data limitation, we are unable to discover 
the long-term effect of matching subsidies. How to maintain a high-level private contribu-
tion, in the long run, is of particular importance to increase the overall effectiveness and 
sustainability of the matching subsidies on the online crowdfunding platforms. This would 
















Chapter 3. An Economic Analysis of Matching Subsidies on the Dynam-
ics of Crowdfunding 
3.1 Introduction 
 The development of information technology enables numerous individual funders 
to support small entrepreneurs without access to traditional financial channels through 
crowdfunding. However, fundraising in the crowdfunding context differs from traditional 
fundraising in several distinct ways. First, it is difficult for individual funders to determine 
a fundraiser’ creditworthiness or a campaign’s quality due to the lack of intermediaries. 
Second, fundraising on crowdfunding platforms typically follows the “all or nothing” 
model, where the fundraisers only receive funding if the target funding goal is reached 
within a limited fundraising period (e.g., one month), which introduces huge uncertainty 
about the success of a campaign.  
Facing uncertainty about the campaign quality and campaign success, funders mainly 
rely on various dynamic information revealed on the crowdfunding platform，such as the 
number of prior funders, the contribution amount from prior funders, etc.,  to determine 
which campaign to support. Crowdfunding dynamics significantly affect the success of a 
campaign. It has been found that early funding plays an important role in attracting poten-
tial funders and increasing the probability of funding success (NESTA, 2014; Vismara, 
2018). Since the dynamics of crowdfunding plays a pivotal role in determining the success 
of campaigns, it is necessary for funders, fundraisers, and platforms to understand the un-
derlying mechanisms that drive the crowdfunding dynamics. 
A large body of literature has studied the mechanisms behind crowdfunding dynamics. 





by herding behavior and payoff externalities (Burtch 2013; Kim et al. 2020; Kuppuswamy 
and Bayus 2018; Li et al. 2020; Zhang and Liu 2012). Herding behavior in crowdfunding, 
referring to the activity that individuals refer to others’ decisions and are more likely to 
fund campaigns with more other supporters, stems from the peer influence theory that an 
individual follows the behavior of others  (Banerjee 1992; Zhang and Liu 2012). In the 
crowdfunding context, potential funders face the uncertainty of campaign quality and risk 
of loss, which makes them rely on the observation of other funders’ behavior in making 
funding choices. Burtch et al. (2013) and Zhang and Liu (2012) find that the accumulated 
funding amount of a campaign reflects previous funders’ collective evaluations of the cam-
paign as manifested in their funding allocation decisions. Consequently, potential funders 
follow the previous funders’ allocation decisions and contribute to campaigns with higher 
accumulated funding, leading to herding behavior. The payoff externalities stem from the 
“all or nothing” model in crowdfunding platforms. With this funding model, an individual 
funder gets the payoff from the contribution only if the contributed campaign receives full 
funding. As the number of funders funding a given campaign increases, or the total funding 
amount increases, it becomes more likely that the campaign reaches its funding goal by the 
deadline. Such payoff externalities also affect the dynamics of crowdfunding. 
In recent years, there have been several studies on promotion strategies, such as in-
vestment matching, to change crowdfunding dynamics and boost funding activities (Kim 
et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020). These studies employ the simulation method and find that the 
promotion strategy can significantly increase the contribution demand. However, there is 
limited research to examine the effect of monetary promotion strategies on funding activity 





from a crowdfunding platform to study how matching subsidies, as one of the most popular 
promotion strategies on crowdfunding platforms, affect crowdfunding dynamics. 
Matching subsidies refer to the promotion strategy that some third-party institutions 
provide a dollar-for-dollar match of the private contributions from individuals on selected 
campaigns. Matching subsidies have been very effective in increasing the success rates of 
campaigns and have been adopted by many prestigious crowdfunding platforms, such as 
Kiva, Kickstarter, and Donorchoose.org. Matching subsidies provide supplemental fund-
ing for campaigns and accelerate the campaign progress, which directly changes the dy-
namic patterns of the crowd fundraising. Besides, matching subsidies may affect the dy-
namics of crowdfunding by influencing herding behavior and payoff externalities. First of 
all, third-party institutions contribute to a campaign by providing matching funds, which 
make individual funders follow their contributions, leading to herding behavior (Herzen-
stein et al., 2011). Secondly, providing matching subsidies to a campaign makes the cam-
paign become more likely to receive full funding, which affects the payoff externality. In 
this essay, we study the effects of matching subsidies on the dynamics of crowdfunding 
through herding behavior and payoff externalities. We aim to address the following re-
search questions: (1) How do matching subsidies affect funders’ herding behavior? (2) 
How do matching subsidies affect funders’ payoff externalities? (3) What are the manage-
rial implications of implementing matching subsidies on the crowdfunding platform? 
To answer the research questions, we leverage the comprehensive data set ranging 
from September 21, 2018, to November 21, 2018, to examine the effects of matching sub-
sidies on crowdfunding dynamics. The data is crawled from Kiva, one of the largest pro-





contains all information about campaigns, funders, and transactions.  
This study finds strong evidence of both herding behavior and positive payoff exter-
nalities on the crowdfunding platform. In contrast to the previous literature in traditional 
prosocial fundraising that prior contributions may crowd out subsequent funding (Burtch 
et al., 2013), we find that prior contributions of a campaign are associated with higher 
subsequent funding in prosocial crowdfunding. However, matching subsidies will moder-
ate the effect of herding and payoff externalities. The reason is that matching subsidies 
provide signals of the quality of a campaign, which moderates the herding momentum. The 
finding supports the rational herding theory that lenders follow the funding activity of other 
funders by observation learning – inferring the quality of a campaign from other funders’ 
behavior (Zhang and Liu).  Besides, matching subsidies reduce the uncertainty of the suc-
cess of a campaign, which further moderates the payoff externalities.  
Interestingly, we find the existence of a “bystander effect,” where funders are less 
likely to provide support, instead of a “completion effect,” where funders race to goal when 
a campaign is close to success. Contrary to the U-shaped funding patterns on reward-based 
crowdfunding platforms, we find that most of the campaigns on Kiva receive relatively less 
funding in the early stage of fundraising compared with the funding in the later stage.  We 
also find that matching subsidies are most effective in the early stages of fundraising. As 
the fundraising progresses, the positive effect of matching subsidies disappears near the 
end of funding. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3.3 describes our data and summary statistics. Section 3.4 presents our empirical 





discusses managerial implications and Section 3.7 concludes the paper with future research 
directions.    
 
3.2. Hypothesis Development 
Crowdfunding dynamics have been found to significantly affect campaign funding 
outcomes in the crowdfunding literature. Previous studies identified three phases of fund-
raising on the crowdfunding platforms (Agrawal et al. 2014; Fisk et al. 2011; Kim et al. 
2020): a “friend funding” phase when funding mainly comes from the friends of fundrais-
ers; a “getting crowded” phase when information cascading and externalities stimulate 
funding; a “race to goal” phase when funding activities accelerate before the goal is 
reached. It has been found that most of the unsuccessful campaigns fail in the “friend fund-
ing” phase due to the lack of early support. Since the dynamics of crowdfunding play a 
pivotal role in determining the success of campaigns, it is necessary for funders, fundrais-
ers, and platforms to understand the underlying mechanisms that drive the crowdfunding 
dynamics.  
3.2.1 Herding Behavior 
Herding behavior refers to the phenomenon that individuals follow the behavior of 
others and invest in well-funded projects (Devenow and Welch 1996). There are mainly 
two streams of literature that explain the mechanisms behind herding behavior – the irra-
tional herding theory and the rational herding theory. The irrational herding theory, also 
called information cascade, stems from social influence, where an individual funder refers 
to others’ decisions as a descriptive social norm (Aderson and Holt 1997; Croson and 





funder just mimics the behavior of other funders. Rational herding behavior is rooted in 
information asymmetry between two parties involved in transactions, where one party has 
more or better information than the other (Akerlof 1970). In business, the company owners 
and sellers have more information than investors and buyers. Consequently, investors and 
buyers tend to rely on observational learning – inferring the behavior of other investors and 
buyers to get information and follow their behavior, leading to herding behavior (Banerjee 
1992; Bikhchandani; Zhang and Liu 2012). 
Herding behavior has been identified and studied in economics and business literature 
in recent several decades. In finance, herding behavior has been identified among institu-
tional investors, who tend to follow each other in buying and selling the same securities in 
both the US stock market and non-US stock markets (Lakonishok et al. 1992; Sias 2004; 
Walter and Webber 2006; Change 2010). Additionally, individual investors tend to be more 
likely to herd compared with institutional investors (Kim and Wei, 2002; Tan et al., 2008). 
Herding behavior also occurs in aggregate market activity. For example, Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) found significant herding in the US and Korean stock markets, which does 
not depend on market conditions and fundamental macroeconomic variables. 
Enormous literature in Marketing and Information Systems has also explored herding 
behavior. In marketing, consumers tend to choose products with more prior consumption, 
leading to herding behavior (Salganik et al., 2006; Cai et al., 2009; Zhang, 2010; Tucker 
and Zhang, 2011). In Information Systems, herding behavior has been examined in a vari-
ety of contexts, including the adoption of Information Technology (Kauffman and Li 2003; 
Sun 2013), online auctions (Simonsohn and Ariely 2008), online retailing (Li and Wu 





In particular, herding behavior has been widely discussed in the crowdfunding and 
microfinance literature (Burtch et al. 2018; Greenwood and Gopal 2016; Herzenstein et al. 
2011; Kim et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2015; Zhang and Liu 2012). These studies 
use the theory of observational learning (Banerjee et al. 1992) to explain herding - potential 
contributors view higher accumulated capital of campaigns as signals of higher quality, 
resulting in higher subsequent contribution amount to these campaigns. Although Burth et 
al.(2013) find that prior contribution may crowd out the subsequent funding on a donation-
based crowdfunding platform that provides public goods, we still expect that herding be-
havior exists in prosocial lending. The reason is that funders in donation-based crowdfund-
ing do not expect repayment. In prosocial lending, funders face the risk of losing their 
repayment, which makes them more likely to fund campaigns with higher quality. We ex-
pect individual funders to rely on the quality signal of accumulated capital to make the 
inference, leading to herding behavior. Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 1a (Herding Behavior):  As cumulative prior contributions increase, the 
subsequent funding amount of a campaign increases. 
3.2.2 Payoff Externality 
Payoff externalities occur if the payoff of a funder’s contribution to a campaign de-
pends on other funders’ funding behavior (Ayres and Kneese 1969; Katz and Shapiro 
1985). For example, the utility of a user of an ATM depends on the total number of ATM 
users. Externalities have been widely studied in Information System literature, including 
IT adoption (Kauffman et al. 2000), software market (Gallaugher and Wang 2002), and 
user-generated content (Zhang and Zhu 2011; Goes et al. 2014).  





platforms follow the “all or nothing” model, also known as the provision point mechanism, 
assurance contract, and threshold public goods (Rondeau et al. 1999). Under this model, a 
fundraiser can only receive funds pledged to the campaign if it reaches the predetermined 
target before the deadline. Otherwise, the funds will be returned to funders, incurring op-
portunity costs. Consequently, funders may face the uncertainty that their contributed cam-
paigns may not receive full funding, and they receive zero utility. Due to the high uncer-
tainty of campaigns, funders are more likely to contribute to a campaign that has already 
reached a high percentage of funding goals because of its greater likelihood of success.  
However, the higher percentage of funding goals may also lead to negative payoff 
externalities through the bystander effect in prosocial crowdfunding. The bystander effect 
stems from the theory that “impact philanthropists” want their contributions to make a dif-
ference (Duncan 2004). Consequently, if contributions from other funders are sufficient to 
reach the target goal, then an individual’s own contribution is no longer pivotal and can 
decrease without much loss in utility. Alternately, if others are not giving, the value from 
an individual’s contribution is higher (Andreoni 1998; Shang and Croson 2009). 
In summary, the effect of the higher percentage of the funding goal is not clear due to 
the competing theories of the payoff externalities and bystander effect. Nevertheless, most 
of the prior empirical studies have documented positive externalities on crowd-funding 
platforms (Burtch et al., 2018; Herzenstein et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2020; Li et al., 2020; 
Zhang and Liu 2012). Although some prior studies find the existence of bystander effect 
(Agrawal et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2020; Herzenstein et al. 2011; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 
2018), they also demonstrate that payoff externalities dominate the bystander effect. All of 





funding, while the bystander effect will reduce the effect of positive payoff externalities 
with increasing goal attainment level. Consequently, we expect that the same insight can 
be carried over to prosocial crowdfunding. Thus, define the percentage of goal attainment 
of a loan at any time as the ratio of total funds received at that time to its target fundraising 
amount. We have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b (Payoff Externalities):  As the percentage of goal attainment in-
creases, the subsequent funding amount of a campaign increases. 
3.2.3 The Role of Matching Subsidies in Herding Behavior and Payoff Externalities 
Recent studies also explore the mechanisms underlying the herding behavior. There 
are two competing theories to explain the herding behavior - irrational herding and ra-
tional herding. The irrational herding theory, also called the information cascade (Vismara 
2018), assumes that lenders passively mimic others’ choices, refer to others’ decisions as 
a descriptive social norm, or follow well-funded and hence salient listings. In contrast, 
rational herding assumes that funders believe that other funders have private information 
on the campaign’s quality (Zhang and Liu 2012). Most of the previous empirical research 
supports the rational herding theory in crowdfunding and finds that quality information of 
campaigns, such as risk assessment and friends’ endorsement, moderate the herding be-
havior (Burtch et al., 2018; Zhang and Liu, 2012). These studies suggest that individuals 
rely more on other available quality information, instead of only prior contributions, to 
make more informed decisions.  
Although previous studies find that quality information of campaigns can affect herd-





Matching subsidies is one of the most popular promotional strategies used on crowdfund-
ing platforms, such as Kiva, Kickstarter, and Donorchoose.org, in recent years. Matching 
subsidies are usually provided by third-part institutions on selected projects (i.e., cam-
paigns) during a short time period. The most popular and most commonly used matching 
method is the dollar-for-dollar match. If a funder contributes to matched campaigns, the 
third-party institution will match the funder’s contribution amount for the campaign. The 
matching subsidies not only double the contribution amount of a funder but accelerate 
funding activities on matched campaigns.  
In the traditional fundraising environment, matching subsidies provide a signal of 
quality for a matched campaign (Karlan and List 2007). The reason is that the third-party 
funders providing matching subsidies will serve as a lead contributor that promise to con-
tribute half of the funding target of a campaign. Consequently, individual funders may 
expect that the lead contributor who promises to provide matching grants may have private 
quality information of campaigns, increasing these campaigns' creditworthiness (Andreoni 
2006b; Glazer and Konrad 1996; Potters et al. 2007; Vesterlund 2003). Similar to tradi-
tional fundraising, matching subsidies on the online crowdfunding platforms also provide 
creditable quality signals for matched campaigns. The signal of matching subsidies may 
have different effects on herding behavior according to different mechanisms behind herd-
ing. If irrational herding theory holds, an individual funder may just mimic the funding 
activity of other funders, ignoring the signal of information of matching. Consequently, 
matching subsidies may have no significant effect on herding behavior. Nevertheless, if 
rational herding theory holds, the quality information of matching subsidies may moderate 





presence of herding but also the reasons behind the herding. For a campaign without the 
quality information of matching subsidies, a rational individual funder can only rely on the 
herding information to make inferences on the quality of the campaign. For a campaign 
with high-quality information from matching subsidies, a rational individual has already 
learned the quality information, which makes them ignore the quality information of herd-
ing. 
To understand the interaction between the signal of herding momentum and matching 
subsidies, we consider the following scenario. There are two well-funded loans with iden-
tical high accumulative funding except that loan one is provided with matching subsidies, 
and loan two do not receive matching subsidies. For a potential rational lender, he may 
partially attribute the herding momentum of loan 1 to the quality information of matching 
subsidies. However, the lender may reason that loan two is well funded because the loan 
has a very high quality so that other lenders are willing to lend to this loan even without 
being matched. Consequently, the positive effect of herding momentum for loan two 
should be stronger than that of loan 1. A lot of empirical studies also show that the quality 
information of other factors, such as friend endorsement (Zhang and Liu 2012) and provi-
sion point mechanism (Burtch et al. 2018), has a substitution effect with herding momen-
tum. 
 As stated above, most of the empirical evidence suggests that rational herding theory 
holds in crowdfunding, especially in prosocial lending. In the prosocial lending context, 
funders lend money to fundraisers instead of donating money to them. Most of the lenders 
expect to get repayment, which makes the rational decision-makers to choose campaigns 





2014; Vesterlund 2003). Accordingly, we conjecture that matching subsidies provide cred-
ible quality signals of campaigns, which may substitute prior cumulative contributions to 
serve as signals of quality, attenuating the effect of prior cumulative contribution on sub-
sequent fundraising for matched campaigns. Therefore, we hypothesize that:       
H2a: (Effect of Matching Subsidies on Herding Behavior) Matching subsidies mod-
erate (attenuate) the herding behavior such that the effect of prior cumulative contri-
butions on subsequent funding amount of a campaign is weaker for campaigns with 
matching subsidy than without it.  
The matching subsidy reduces the uncertainty of campaign success since it provides 
half the amount of the total funding required. However, the less uncertainty of success may 
lead to a “bystander effect,” where funders may be less likely to contribute to a campaign 
with a higher probability of reaching the target amount. The reason is that individual fun-
ders may think their contributions do not play a pivotal role in determining the success of 
the campaign since the campaign will reach the target regardless (Kim et al. 2020). Prior 
field experiment has provided evidence that matching subsidies lead to strong bystander 
effect and reduce the subsequent contributions in prosocial funding (Shang and Croson 
2009).  
In our research context, campaigns receiving matching subsidies are expected to be 
more likely to reach the target goal since third party institutions will fulfill half of the target 
funding amount. The potential funders may believe matched campaigns will be fully 
funded even without their contributions, which leads to a strong bystander effect on 
matched loans. Consequently, we expect that matching subsidies moderate the effect of 





H2b: (Effect of Matching Subsidies on Payoff Externalities) Matching subsidies 
moderate (attenuate) the payoff externalities such that the effect of goal attainment on 
subsequent funding amount of a campaign is weaker for campaigns with matching 
subsidy than without it.  
 
3.3. Data Description 
This study utilizes a comprehensive transaction-level data set collected from Kiva.org, 
which is the world’s largest online peer-to-peer lending platform. It has raised $1.37 billion 
in funds for more than 3.4 million borrowers from 1.8 million lenders since its inception in 
October 2005. It is an online microfinance platform for the poor, unbanked, and under-
served.  
Most loans on Kiva are donation-based with a 0% interest rate for the borrowers who, 
by and large, are located in developing countries. However, borrowers in Kiva are still 
expected to repay the principal to lenders within the repayment term. Kiva will partner with 
local field partners to collect the repayment, which guarantees that 95.9% of loans make 
the repayment (Kiva 2020). Although loans in Kiva have relatively high repayment rates, 
lenders still face the risk of losing their money if a loan defaults. Consequently, the lending 
decision in Kiva is driven by both financial and prosocial motives. Liu et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that lenders in Kiva make lending decisions with both extrinsic and intrinsic mo-
tivations. Galak et al. 2011 also demonstrate that both financial and psychological factors 
affect the funding outcomes in Kiva.  





disclose information about loans. For example, Kiva provides loan-level information, in-
cluding the field partner's credit rating, the business plan of the loan, and the borrower's 
description. The platform also shares the dynamic updates of a loan on the loan page. Kiva 
provides real-time information about accumulative funding amount, the percentage of goal 
attainment level, and the number of accumulative lenders. The transparent information dis-
closure helps reduce in-formation asymmetry and ease fundraising. However, there are still 
many failed loans due to the lack of funding.  
To help more small enterprises to achieve their funding goals, Kiva partners with some 
anonymous lenders and third party foundations, such as Google and WAGE(Women and 
Girls Empowered Foundation), to provide matching subsidies for selected loans7. Under 
this program, the matching partner defines the criteria about which loans should be 
matched, and the qualified loans will then be displayed with an “x2” badge with the part-
ner’s name on the platform. If any lender makes contributions to matched loans, the match-
ing partners will lend the same amount to those loans. Accordingly, lenders can double the 
impact of their contributions when they lend to matched loans. Matching subsidies promote 
campaigns and accelerate funding activities, which may affect the dynamics of crowdfund-
ing. Therefore, we utilize the observations on Kiva to study the influence of matching sub-
sidies on crowdfunding dynamics.  
We retrieve granular transaction-level observations occurring from August 21, 2018, 
to September 21, 2018, using Kiva public API. The data contains detailed information for 
 
7 As shown in Essay 1, more than half of the loans are matched by anonymous supporters in the matching 
event.  The data in essay 2 have a longer period, which contains both matching events and regular matching 
subsidies.  The data in Essay 2 shows that 9003 loans are matched by anon-ymous supporters among the 
14964 matched loans. Consequently, Consequently, we also believe that the branding effect is not strong in 





each lending activity, such as the lender, the borrower, the lending amount, and the 
timestamp. The data set contains 1,138,070 lending actions taken by 202,879 lenders. Ag-
gregating the transaction-level data, we construct a loan-daily level panel data, consisting 
of 63897 loans in the three-month period.   
Figure 3.1 presents how the average daily funded amounts of matched and unmatched 
loans at different goal attainment levels.  Since there is a lot of extremely large values of 
the daily funded amount, we use the log form of the funded amount in the figure. Un-
matched loans receive, on average, relatively little support ($34.3 per day) at the beginning 
stages of the funding.  
Figure 3.1. Dynamic patterns based on goal attainment level  
 
The pattern in Figure 3.1 is consistent with the previous findings that most of the 
crowdfunding campaigns suffer from a lack of early support, which reduces the probability 
of reaching the target goals (Kim et al., 2020; Li et al., 2020). Once the funded amount 
reaches 10% of the target goal, the daily funding amount continuously increases. However, 





drops sharply. The pattern is different from previous findings that campaign close to suc-
cessfully receive more support. 
Matching subsidies significantly promote campaigns in the early stage of funding. For 
matched loans with less than 10% of target goals, matching subsidies increase their average 
daily funded amount significantly, and the daily funded amount continuously increases 
once the matched loan reaches 10% of target goals, similar to the pattern of unmatched 
loans. The daily funded amount to matched loans also drops to the same level as unmatched 
loans when it is close to success.  
The dependent variable for the empirical model is FundAmountit, the amount of dona-
tions (in US Dollars) received by campaign i on day t, after excluding matched contribu-
tions. The first independent variable of interest is AccumAmountit, referring to the accumu-
lated funding amount of campaign i before day t. The accumulated funding amount is often 
used to measure herding activity in previous studies (Burtch et al., 2013; Kuppuswamy and 
Bayus, 2018). Our second variable of interest is Percentit, accounting for the percentage of 
goal attainment of a campaign i before day t. The variable is used to measure payoff exter-
nalities. The binary variable Matchit equals 1 if the campaign i is matched on day t.  
We use two sets of control variables to address the concern of endogeneity. First, the 
time-varying control variables are included to mitigate the potential omitted variables con-
cern. The variable Competitionit, referring to the number of other active and similar loans 
competing with loan i on day t, is included to control for competition (Ly and Mason 2012). 
Similar loans are defined as loans with the same country and sector. We also use the vari-
able DaysLapsedit, referring to the number of days between the current day t and the posted 





GTrendsit, referring to the Google Trends Index of loan i at day t, to control for the time-
variant popularity of a loan caused by exogenous shocks. The Google Trends Index is re-
trieved from Google Analytics by employing two keywords of country and sector associ-
ated with each loan on each day. The variable represents the relative search volume of 
keywords, which is widely used in the IS literature to serve as a proxy for the popularity 
of campaigns (Burtch et al., 2013).   
Second, we use the time-invariant and day dummies to control the individual hetero-
geneity of loans and time effects. The funding activities of a campaign may be driven by 
the individual characteristics of loans. Especially on the crowdfunding platforms, the “soft 
information,” such as pictures of fundraisers, narratives of projects’ descriptions, plays a 
pivotal role in influencing the funding amounts of loans. We thus include loan fixed effects 
to control the heterogeneity. Besides, the funding activities of a campaign may also be 
affected by some exogenous shocks, which are difficult to measure. Consequently, we use 
the day dummies to control for the exogenous shocks. Descriptive statistics of the main 
variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
N=612,088 MIN MAX MEAN SD 
FundAmount 0 46275 59.19 260.67 
AccumAmount 0 99925 130.1 663.7 
Percent  0 0.99 0.1 0.17 
Match 0 1 0.02 0.2 
Competition 1 603 116.7 135.01 
DayLapsed 0 80 11.44 8.92 
GTrends 10 100 73.36  19.56 
 
Since both AccumAmountit and Percentit change with prior contributions, we provide 





the correlation coefficients are within the acceptable range. The highest correlation is be-
tween the variables AccumAmountit and Percentit 0.38, which is still lower than the rule of 
thumb cut-off value 0.7 (Dormann et al. 2013). This low correlation is understandable be-
cause the percentage of goal attainment is determined by both the accumulated funded 
amounts and the target goals of campaigns. We also conduct the variance inflation (VIF) 
test to check multicollinearity. As shown in the Table B1 of VIF test results, the largest 
VIF values are 2.69 and 2.37 for variables AccumAmountit and Percentit respectively, below 
the rule of thumb cut-off value 10 (Dormann et al. 2013).  
Table 3.2. Variables correlation 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FundAmount 1       
AccumAmount 0.28 1      
Percent  0.15 0.38 1     
Match 0.13 0.1 0.15 1    
Competition -0.1 -0.1 -0.17 -0.07 1   
DayLapsed -0.06 0.09 0.2 -0.07 0.08 1  
GTrends 0 0 0 0.01 0.18 -0.01 1 
 
3.4. Model and Estimation 
We now introduce the econometric model used to test the hypotheses. Our dependent 
variable of the funded amount is non-negative and integer, which is a count variable be-
cause potential lenders can only provide funds in $25 increments instead of any value on 
Kiva. Simple OLS regression will lead to biased and inconsistent estimation for count de-
pendent variables. Besides, our count dependent variables exhibit overdispersion, which is 
evident from Table 3.1 that the variance of the dependent variables is significantly larger 
than their mean values. The overdispersion of dependent variables makes the negative bi-
nomial model (Hausman et al. 1984) preferred over the Poisson model in our research. The 





𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 =   𝑓(𝛼1𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
   𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ,𝑡 ∗    𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 )                                
(3.1) 
In Equation 3.1, we use a count model to estimate the relationship between FundA-
mountit and other independent variables. The function f represents the negative binomial 
regression model. The coefficients of interest are AccumAmountit and Percentit, measuring 
the herding momentum and the percentage of goal attainment, respectively. We use the 
dummy variable Matchit to indicate whether a campaign receives matching subsidies on a 
specific day. We include the interaction terms Matchit* AccumAmountit and Matchit*Per-
centit, to study the effects of matching subsidies on herding behavior and payoff externali-
ties, respectively. A vector of time-varying control variables X, containing Competitionit , 
DayLapsedit, and GTrendsit, is included to control the competition effect and time effect. 
The variable µt is the day fixed effect; λi is the loan fixed effect, controlling for the time-
invariant loan-specific preference; εit is the loan-day idiosyncratic error term. 
The variable AccumAmountit and Percentit are both included in the main model since 
both herding behavior, and payoff externalities are important drivers of crowdfunding dy-
namics. Consider the following scenario: there are two otherwise identical loans with dif-
ferent accumulated contributions. The loan with a higher accumulated contribution is more 
desirable than the other since it is more likely to be fully funded. This can be due to both 
herding (reflected by accumulated contribution) and payoff externality (reflected by the 
higher percentage of goal attainment). Missing of payoff externalities may lead to overes-
timation of the herding effect and vise versa. 





amount and percentage of goal attainment, consider the scenarios presented in Table 3.3. 
There are two loans with different target amount: loan A expects to borrow $1000, while 
loan B expects to borrow $10000. In scenario 1, the two loans have the same accumulative 
funding amount. Without considering payoff externalities, the two loans should have the 
same subsequent fund-ing due to the same accumulative funding amount. However, loan 
A is close to success, while loan B still needs to raise the remaining 92% funding. Conse-
quently, the existence of payoff externalities will make loan A attract higher subsequent 
funding than that of loan B even with the same herding momentum. Without the consider-
ation of payoff externalities in scenario one will lead to biased estimation. 
Table 3.3. Thought Experiment to Distinguish Herding and Payoff Externalities 
  A B 
 Target $1000 $10000 
Scenario 1 
AccumAmount $800 $800 
Percent 80% 8% 
Scenario 2 
AccumAmount $800 $8000 
Percent 80% 80% 
Note: This table presents two scenarios to distinguish the herding behavior measured 
by the accumulative funding amount(AccumAmount) and payoff externalities meas-
ured by the percentage of goal attainment (Percent). 
 
In scenario one, the two loans have the same 80% percentage of goal attainment level. 
Both loans have high probabilities of receiving full funding. Without considering herding 
behavior, the two loans should have the same subsequent funding due to the same payoff 
externalities of the goal attainment level. However, the fact that loan B has received higher 
prior contributions from more funders makes potential funders perceive that loan B has a 
higher quality because prior funders collectively lend a larger amount to loan B. Conse-





funding than that of loan A even with the same payoff externalities. Without the consider-
ation of herding behavior in scenario two will also lead to biased estimation. 
Additionally, the variable correlations in Table 3.2 and VIF test in Table B1 indicate 
no multi-collinearity issue when the two variables AccumAmountit and Percentit are in-
cluded in the estimation model 
Our hypotheses in Section 3.2 can be empirically tested by estimating the coefficients 
of variables in Equation 3.1. The Hypotheses 1a and 1b suggest that the funded amount is 
positively associated with higher prior accumulated contributions and percentage of goal 
attainment, respectively, i.e., the coefficients of AccumAmountit and Percentit are expected 
to be positive. Hypotheses H2a and H2b suggest that matching subsidies moderate the 
herding behavior and payoff externalities, which indicates that the coefficients of interac-
tion terms Matchit* AccumAmountit and Matchit *Percentit, should be negative.  
The estimation results of Equation 3.1 are presented in Table 3.4. Column (1) and (2) 
shows the estimation with and without interaction terms, respectively. We include control 
variables in columns (3) and (4) to control the time-variant factor.  The independent varia-
bles AccumAmount, Competition, and DayLapsed are transformed into log form since the 
variables are highly skewed. The variable GTrends is divided by 100 to scale it between 0 
and 1. From the estimation results, the coefficients of AccumAmount are positive and sig-
nificant in all of the columns, which supports the hypothesis of herding behavior (H1a). 
Additionally, the positive and significant coefficients of Percent in four columns suggest 
that a campaign with a higher percentage of goal attainment receives a larger amount of 
funds, which supports the hypothesis of payoff externalities (H1b). The results are con-





externalities in crowdfunding dynamics. Besides, the coefficient of Match is also positive 
and significant, implying that matching subsidies increase private contributions.  
The magnitude of the coefficients is also significant. The estimated coefficient of Ac-
cumAmount in column (4) is 0.36, which implies that a one percent increase of accumulated 
contributions corresponds to 0.36% higher daily contributions. Likewise, one additional 
percent increase in the percentage of goal attainment is associated with 1.64% higher total 
daily contributions. The results provide evidence that matching subsidies are very effective 
in boosting funding, supporting the usage of matching subsidies on crowdfunding plat-
forms.  
Table 3.4. The Effects of Matching Subsidies on Crowdfunding Dynamics 
 NEGATIVE BINOMIAL FIXED-EFFECTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AccumAmount 0.32***(0) 0.31***(0) 0.37***(0) 0.36***(0) 
Percent  1.56***(0.02) 1.91***(0.02) 1.32***(0.02) 1.64***(0.02) 
Match 1.33***(0.01) 2.62***(0.02) 1.18***(0.01) 2.33***(0.02) 
Match* AccumAmount  -0.24***(0.01)  -0.22***(0.01) 
Match*Percent  -1.62***(0.05)  -1.35***(0.05) 
Competition   -0.19***(0) -0.19***(0) 
DayLapsed   -0.42***(0) -0.42***(0) 
GTrends   0.17***(0.01) 0.14***(0.01) 
Observations 561,086 561,086  561,086 
Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10. The standard errors 
are 0 because they are less than 0.01. The estimation is implemented with the negative binomial model 
controlling the loan-specific fixed effects. The estimation drops all of the loans with all zero outcomes 
and only one observation per loan.  
 
The interaction terms of Match*AccumAmount and Match*Percent in columns (2) and 
(4) are all negative and significant, implying that matching subsidies moderate the herding 
behavior and payoff externalities, respectively. The results support H2a and H2b. For 





are still positively associated with higher daily contributions since the sum of Match and 
Match*AccumAmount, as well as the sum of Match and Match*Percent are still positive. 
However, the magnitude of the herding effect and payoff externalities of matched loans are 
smaller than that of unmatched loans.   
The coefficients of control variables also make sense. The coefficients of Competition 
in columns (3) and (4) are all negative and significant, suggesting that competition between 
similar loans reduces the funding amounts to these loans (Ly and Mason 2012). The nega-
tive and significant sign of DayLapsed indicates that the funding speed reduces as time 
lapses, consistent with the prior literature (Kim et al. 2020). The positive and significant 
sign of GTrends demonstrates that more popular loans receive higher funding amounts, 
which all make intuitive sense. 
 
3.5. Robustness Checks 
3.5.1 Endogeneity of Matching Subsidies 
On Kiva, whether a loan receives matching subsidies is not a random decision. Instead, 
the matched loans are selected by certain criteria based on loan characteristics (Kiva 2020). 
Without a random assignment, bias may arise because of the systemic differences between 
matched and unmatched loans, which the fixed effects regression may be unable to capture. 
Consequently, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to address this issue, which in-
volves the pairing of control and treated observations with similar characteristics (Dehejia 
and Wahba 2002).  
In our study, different loans are provided with matching subsidies at different dates. 





time-invariant loan characteristics. Consequently, we match the loans receiving matching 
subsides with active loans that do not receive matching funds on the same day.  
In the matching procedure, an indicator of matched loan is modeled as a function of 
loan-level characteristics: LoanAmount, which measures the target amount of the loan; Re-
payTerm represents the number of months over which the borrower will repay the loan; 
IsGroup is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if the loan has more than one borrower; 
IsFemale is a binary variable, which equal to 1 if the borrower of the loan is female; Coun-
try is the country where the loan is located; Sector represents the sector of the loan. These 
characteristics are all important criteria to determine whether the loan will be matched.  
Using these loan characteristics, we estimate a logit model to predict whether a loan 
should be matched. Based on the predicted propensity scores from the logit model, one 
treated loan is matched with one untreated loan with replacement using the nearest neigh-
bor algorithm. The balanced check of propensity score matching is presented in Table 3.5.  





 CTRL TREAT SMD CTRL TREAT SMD 
Count 52345 10864  3577 4177  
LoanAmount 729.25 1079.11 0.22 834.88 951.96 0.08 
RepayTerm 14.09 11.44 0.42 12.18 12.34 0.03 
IsGroup 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.13 0.14 0.02 
IsFemale 0.75 0.78 0.06 0.77 0.74 0.06 
Country NA NA 0.69 NA NA 0.2 
Sector NA NA 0.34 NA NA 0.07 
Note: The Treat column presents the mean of variables for loans receiving 
matching subsidies. The Ctrl column presents the mean of variables for 
loans without receiving matching subsidies. The standardized mean devia-
tion (SMD) is widely used in the literature to measure the balance of varia-
bles between treated groups and control groups. 
 
As a rule of thumb, the standardized mean deviation (SMD) of variables between 





matched data is balanced (Rosenbaum 2010). From the result of the after-matching balance 
check in Table 3.5, most of the SMD is smaller than 0.1, and only the SMD of Country is 
0.2. The results indicate that loans in the treated group and the control group are balanced. 
Finally, we create a sample consisting of 7694 loans for further analysis. 
The data set sampled from propensity score matching contains 77231 loan-daily obser-
vations involving 7694 loans. We re-estimate the main specification, utilizing the matched 
data set. The estimation results are presented in Table 3.6. The estimated coefficients are 
consistent with those in the main regression. 













Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. The standard errors are 0 because 
they are less than 0.01. The estimation is implemented with the 
negative binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed ef-
fects. The estimation drops all of the loans with all zero outcomes 
and only one observation per loan.  
 
3.5.2. Fixed Effects vs. Negative Binomial Fixed Effects  
 Considering that the dependent variable is a count variable, we have employed the 
negative binomial fixed effects model in our main model analysis. The negative binomial 
fixed effects model, proposed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), assumes that the 
joint probability of the counts for each group depends on the sum of the counts for the 





fact, control for all stable covariates (Allison and Waterman 2002). To address the issue, 
we use the fixed effects model (Woodridge 2010) to check for robustness. The estimation 
results of the fixed effects model are presented in Table 3.7. using the full sample and 
sampled data selected from the propensity score matching procedure. From the estimation 
results, all of the hypotheses are still supported, indicating that our results are robust against 
the estimation method.  






AccumAmount 0.24***(0) 0.18***(0.01) 
Percent 2.69***(0.04) 3.83***(0.1) 
Match 3.33***(0.03) 3.32***(0.05) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.12***(0.02) -0.07**(0.03) 
Match*Percent -2.88***(0.1) -3.89***(0.18) 
Competition -0.36***(0.01) -0.27***(0.04) 
DayLapsed -0.03***(0) -0.02**(0.01) 
GTrends 0.06**(0.02) 0.48***(0.06) 
Observations 612,088 77,231 
Adjusted R-Square 0.28 0.354 
The estimation is implemented with the fixed effects model controlling the loan fixed ef-
fects. The first column presents the estimation of the fixed effects model using the full 
sample data. The second column presents the estimation of the fixed effects model using 
the sampled data selected from the propensity score matching procedure.  
Note: Robust Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. 
The standard errors are 0 because they are less than 0.01.  
 
3.5.3 Alternative Measure of Herding Momentum 
Although a loan’s accumulated funding amount is a good measure of herding momen-
tum, prior empirical studies have proposed multiple alternative constructs to measure the 
strength of the herd. For example, Burtch et al. (2013) measure the herding momentum by 
contribution frequency, calculated as the cumulative funding amount contributed to a given 
campaign, divided by the days lapsed (the number of days between the posted day and 
current time) of a campaign on the crowdfunding platform. They find that higher prior 





To test whether the alternative measure of herding momentum may affect the estimation 
result, we re-estimate the model of Equation 3.1 by replacing AccuAmountit with Accum-
Lenderit (cumulative number of prior lenders who have lent to campaign i before day t) and 
ContrFreqit (the contribution frequency of campaign i before day t) respectively. We also 
transform the alternative measures of herding momentum into the log form.  






AccumLender  0.77***(0)  
ContrFreq  0.41***(0) 
Percent  1.01***(0.02) 1.84***(0.02) 
Match 2.34***(0.02) 2.67***(0.02) 
Match* AccumLender -0.45***(0.01)  
Match* 
ContrFreq  -0.44***(0.01) 
Match*Percent -1.08***(0.05) -1.05***(0.05) 
Competition  -0.15***(0) -0.21***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.4***(0) -0.13***(0) 
GTrends 0.1***(0.01) 0.09***(0.01) 
Observations 561,086 561,086 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using 
AccumLender and ContrFreq as alternative measures of herding momen-
tum. Standard Errors are provided in parenthe-
ses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. The estimation is implemented with the 
negative binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects. The es-
timation drops all of the groups (loans) with all zero outcomes and only one 
observation per group. 
 
Table 3.8 provides the estimation results for robustness checks. The hypotheses H1a 
and H1b are still supported by alternative measures of herding momentum. Besides, the 
herding effect and payoff externalities are also moderated by matching subsidies, support-
ing Hypotheses H2a and H2b. It indicates that our results about herding behavior are robust 
against other measures of herding momentum. Because Kiva is a lending-based prosocial 
crowdfunding platform, lenders care very much whether they can receive repayment in the 
future. Consequently, lenders on Kiva respond positively to the herding momentum, which 






3.5.4 Alternative Data Sampling 
Another concern of the estimation results is rooted in the data. First, most of the loans 
on Kiva have a relatively small target amount. Since Kiva only allows lenders to make 
contributions with $25 increments, loans with a small target amount can be easily influ-
enced by a single lender. For example, a loan with a $100 target amount will easily reach 
50% of the funding goal by a funder who contributes $50. Consequently, the estimation 
results may be affected by loans with a small target amount. To address this issue, we 
sample loans with more than $500 (median of all loans) target amount for robustness check. 
Second, some loans in our data set are posted before August 21, 2018, or closed after No-
vember 21, 2018. Therefore, our data set cannot contain all time periods of these loans. We 
thus drop these loans for which we do not have full observations. Table 3.9 presents the 
estimation results for the sampled data. The results still support all of the hypotheses.  




LOANS WITH FULL-TIME 
PERIODS 
AccumAmount  0.38***(0) 0.35***(0) 
Percent  1.49***(0.02) 1.6***(0.02) 
Match 2.2***(0.03) 2.25***(0.02) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.18***(0.01) -0.21***(0.01) 
Match*Percent -1.49***(0.06) -1.31***(0.06) 
Competition  -0.19***(0) -0.2***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.44***(0) -0.42***(0) 
GTrends 0.1***(0.02) 0.07***(0.02) 
Observations 411,052 421,454 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using groups 
(loans) with more than $500 funded amount and loans with complete funding 
history. Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. The estimation is implemented with the negative 
binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects. The estimation drops 
all of the groups with all zero outcomes and only one observation per group. 
 





Since matching subsidies are provided by different third-party lenders or institutions, 
the concern of the branding effect of matching providers also exists in Essay 2. The data 
set in Essay 2 contains both matching events and regular matching subsidies.   Among the 
14964 matched loans, 9003 loans are matched by anonymous supporters. Consequently, 
we believe that the branding effect is not a concern in Essay 2.  
To future address the issue of branding effect, I also conduct a robustness check similar 
to Table 3.10. I split the main independent variable Match into multiple dummy variables 
based on the matching grant’s provider of a campaign. Due to the space limitation, I only 
include the anonymous supporters and the other top 5 matching providers that match the 
most number of loans: Anonym (Anonymous Supporters matches 9003 loans), Google 
(matching 597 loans), WAGE(Women and Girls Empowered Foundation matches 586 
loans), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees matches 550 loans), 
BobFund (Bobbi Brown Cosmetics matches 481 loans),  and RichardFund(the Richard 
Brindle Foundation matches 324 loans). Using the new dummy variables, I test whether 
the branding effect exists in Table 3. 10. 
The main results in Table 3.10 are consistent with those in Table 3.4. From the results 
in column (1) and (2), the six dummy variables of matching providers all have a positive 
and significant sign, which shows that matching subsidies with different matching provid-
ers all increase the number of funders and total contributions. Additionally, almost all of 
the interaction terms in column (2) are consistent with those in Table 3.4. The only differ-
ence is that the interaction term of Wage*AccuAmount is positive and significant. How-
ever, we don’t find a strong branding effect since most of the matching providers bring a 






Table 3.10. Robustness Check with Branding Effect 
 NEGATIVE BINOMIAL FIXED-EFFECTS 
 (1) (2) 
AccumAmount 0.35***(0.01) 0.33***(0.01) 
Percent  1.5***(0.05) 2.16***(0.05) 
Anonym 1.43***(0.03) 2.54***(0.06) 
BobFund 1.25***(0.18) 2.68***(0.34) 
Google 1.1***(0.1) 2.67***(0.25) 
RichardFund 1.2***(0.09) 2.24***(0.19) 
WAGE 1.87***(0.09) 1.41***(0.29) 
UNHCR 1.69***(0.1) 2.39***(0.24) 
Anonym*AccumAmount  -0.24***(0.03) 
BobFund*AccumAmount  -0.14(0.16) 
Google*AccumAmount  -0.25***(0.06) 
RichardFund*AccumAmount  -0.34***(0.09) 
WAGE*AccumAmount  0.99***(0.15) 
UNHCR*AccumAmount  -0.08(0.11) 
Anonym*Percent  -1.86***(0.16) 
BobFund*Percent  -3.08***(0.97) 
Google*Percent  -1.27***(0.36) 
RichardFund*Percent  -0.64(0.62) 
WAGE*Percent  -7.25***(0.63) 
UNHCR*Percent  -2.12***(0.66) 
Competition -0.19***(0.01) -0.18***(0.01) 
DayLapsed -0.18***(0.01) -0.19***(0.01) 
GTrends 0.4***(0.04) 0.36***(0.04) 
Observations 64,602 64,602 
Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10. 
The standard errors are 0 because they are less than 0.01. The estimation is imple-
mented with the negative binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed ef-
fects. The estimation drops all of the loans with full zero outcomes and only one 
observation per loan. 
 
3.5.6. Alternative Data Set 
Our data set only has a three-month time period from 21 August 2018 to 21 November 
2018. There may be a seasonal trend in funding activities on Kiva, which may affect the 
estimation results. To address the issue, we collect two alternative data sets in different 
time periods for robustness checks. These data sets are all loan-daily level panel data set, 





The first data set is from January 5, 2019, to March 4, 2019, consisting of 445,368 obser-
vations involving 42,229 loans. The second data set is from June 4, 2019, to August 232019, 
consisting of 556,858 observations involving 52,875 loans. These alternative data sets 
cover different time range and seasons compared with the data set used in the main model 
estimation. The estimation results of the negative binomial fixed effects model using the 
two alternative data sets are presented in Table 3.11.  
The estimation results in Table 3.11 still support all of the hypotheses. Additionally, 
we also provide the variable statistics, correlation matrix, multicollinearity check, and other 
robustness estimation using the first and second alternative data sets in Appendix C and D, 
respectively.  
Table 3.11. Robustness Check with Alternative Data Sets 
 
JANUARY 5, 2019 
TO 
MARCH 4, 2019 
JUNE 4, 2019 
TO 
AUGUST 23, 2019 
AccumAmount  0.39***(0) 0.33***(0) 
Percent  1.58***(0.02) 1.86***(0.02) 
Match 2.21***(0.04) 2.17***(0.02) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.25***(0.01) -0.18***(0.01) 
Match*Percent -0.73***(0.09) -1.27***(0.05) 
Competition  -0.14***(0) -0.18***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.49***(0) -0.47***(0) 
GTrends 0.38***(0.02) 0.002(0.01) 
Observations 397,209 517,024 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using two alternative 
data sets in different periods. The first column presents the estimation results using the 
data set that starts from January 5, 2019, to March 4, 2019. The second column presents 
the estimation results using the data set that starts from June 4, 2019, to August 23, 2019. 
The estimation is implemented with the negative binomial model controlling the loan-
specific fixed effects. The estimation drops all of the groups with all zero outcomes and 
only one observation per group. Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. 
 ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. 
 
3.6. Managerial Implications 
Our empirical analyses show that matching subsidies moderate the herding effect and 





of matching subsidies. Our main model analysis suggests that it is more effective to provide 
matching subsidies in the early stages since the effect of promotion diminishes in the later 
stages. However, the moderating effect of matching subsidies may not be linear. Based on 
the percentage of goal attainment, we are interested in examining the effectiveness of 
matching subsidies in different fundraising stages. We replace the continuous independent 
variable Percent with a vector of dummy variables that reflect increments of 10 percent 
toward the fundraising target, up to 90 percent, omitting the dummy for capital accumula-
tion between 0 and 9.99 percent of the target, in Equation 3.1. Additionally, we drop the 
interaction term of Match*AccumAmount. The estimation results are showed in Table 3.12. 





Match  2.06***(0.02) 
10 Percent  0.49***(0.01) 
20 Percent 0.78***(0.01) 
30 Percent 1.03***(0.01) 
40 Percent 1.21***(0.01) 
50 Percent 1.34***(0.01) 
60 Percent 1.49***(0.02) 
70 Percent 1.42***(0.02) 
80 Percent 1.47***(0.02) 
90 Percent 0.78***(0.03) 
Match*10 Percent  -0.35***(0.03) 
Match*20 Percent -0.61***(0.03) 
Match*30 Percent -0.86***(0.03) 
Match*40 Percent -1.06***(0.04) 
Match*50 Percent -1.16***(0.04) 
Match*60 Percent -1.39***(0.04) 
Match*70 Percent -1.33***(0.05) 
Match*80 Percent -1.89***(0.06) 




 Observations 561,086 
Note: Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. The estimation is implemented with the 
negative binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects. 
The estimation drops all of the loans with all zero outcomes and only 





According to Table 3.11, the effect of payoff externalities of matched loans is always 
weaker than that of unmatched loans because interaction terms between Match and percent 
dummy variables are all negative and significant. The result is consistent with the findings 
in the main model estimation.  
Figure 3.2 presents the marginal effect of the percentage dummies. As shown in Figure 
3.2, an additional 10% increase in goal attainment leads to a higher level of increment of 
unmatched loans than that of matched loans. Besides, we find a first increasing then de-
creasing pattern of the effect on goal attainment level for unmatched loans. That is, the 
positive effect of goal attainment increases in the early stages (0-60% of the target goal), 
stays stable in the middle stages (61%-90% of the target goal), and drops significantly in 
the final stage of funding.  
Figure 3.2. The Effects of Goal Attainment Level on Matched and Unmatched 
Loans 
 





but becomes negative after the funding amount reaches 80% of the target. Our results in-
dicate the extremely strong “bystander effect” when the funding amount is close to reach-
ing the target for both matched and unmatched loans. The result is different from the pre-
vious finding of the “completion effect,” where funders contribute more as a campaign’s 
cumulative funding gets closer to its target goal (Argo et al. 2020; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 
2017; Wash 2013). 
Figure 3.3 visualizes the marginal effects of matching subsidies in different stages of 
goal attainment. The vertical axis shows the percentage change of the daily funding amount 
compared with the daily funding amount in the stage with less than 10% goal attainment. 
We see that matching subsidies are most effective in the early stages of funding. The effect 
of matching subsidies decreases as the goal attainment level increases. Once a loan reaches 
90% of the target goal, the matching subsidies no longer have a significant and positive 
effect.  








This study identifies both herding behavior and positive payoff externalities on a pro-
social crowdfunding platform. We find that higher prior contributions serve as a signal of 
high quality, leading to more subsequent funding. Additionally, the higher percentage of 
goal attainment increases the possibility of success for a campaign, inducing higher subse-
quent contributions.  
However, we find that promotional strategies, such as matching subsidies, may mod-
erate the herding behavior and positive payoff externalities. In other words, as cumulative 
contributions and percentage of goal attainment increase, the subsequent funding amount 
of a campaign matched by a prestigious institution increases less than that of an unmatched 
campaign. 
We also examine the crowdfunding dynamics by studying the effects of cumulative 
contributions in different stages of funding for both matched and unmatched loans. Overall, 
we find that the positive effect of cumulative contributions on subsequent funding of a 
campaign increases until it reaches 60% of the target goal.  We do not find evidence of the 
“completion effect,” where a campaign close to completion receives higher funding than 
any other stage. Instead, we find that the positive effect of cumulative prior contributions 
drops sharply once it reaches 90% of the target goal, suggesting a “bystander effect,” where 
funders are less likely to contribute to a campaign with a higher probability of reaching the 
target amount because individual funders may think their contributions do not play a piv-
otal role in determining the success of the campaign on the prosocial crowdfunding plat-
form.  





strategy. We find that it is most effective to provide matching subsidies to a campaign at 
the early stages of funding (e.g., before it reaches 10% of the target goal). Besides, match-
ing subsidies do not significantly increase private contributions at the final stages of fund-
ing.  
Essay 2 makes both theoretical and practical contributions in multiple streams of litera-
ture. First, the essay contributes to the literature on crowdfunding by providing strong ev-
idence of herding behavior and positive payoff externalities on prosocial crowdfunding 
platforms. Essay 2 also provides additional empirical evidence to the literature studying 
the relationship be-tween herding momentum and quality information (Burtch et al., 2018; 
Zhang and Liu 2012). The findings are consistent with previous literature that the presence 
of matching subsidies signals the quality of a campaign, which may have a substitution 
effect with the quality information of herding momentum.  
Second, essay 2 contributes to the literature on crowdfunding dynamics. Previous liter-
ature has used the structural choice model and counterfactual simulation to explore how 
the effect of promotion strategy varies with crowdfunding dynamics and find that promo-
tion strategy is most effective in the early stage of funding (Kim et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020). 
Using the loan dai-ly-level panel data, Essay 2 provides consistent empirical evidence that 
the promotion strategy of matching subsidies has a stronger effect in the early stage of 
funding. The finding provides managerial insights that the third part institutions can most 
effectively provide matching subsidies in the early stages of fundraising.  
Finally, essay 2 contributes to the literature on matching subsidies in economics. Previ-
ous economics literature focuses on the overall effectiveness of matching subsidies on 





and Murphy 2019). This essay enriches the literature by demonstrating that the effect of 
matching subsidies depends on the levels of goal attainment and accumulated funding. Our 























Chapter 4. Challenges and Skills Set in Empirical Research  
All the essays in my thesis are the results of five years of largely independent idea 
generation, data collection, and research development in the context of crowdfunding. This 
chapter shares the experience of research development in topic generation, data collection, 
technical skills, methodology, and experiment, as well as writing and communication.  
 
4.1. Topic Generation 
The first challenge of empirical research is how to generate interesting research ideas. 
In the crowdfunding context, there are numerous interesting, and novel topics remain un-
explored. However, it is difficult to find a novel research topic due to the lack of theoretical 
foundations or data sources. As a business researcher, we aim to make theoretical contri-
butions instead of only conducting data analytics. Additionally, our research should be in-
novative, which requires us to be knowledgeable about the current literature and the re-
search gaps.  
The comprehensive literature review and a wide range of reading help me overcome 
the challenge. The literature review helps me identify research gaps and theoretical foun-
dations, while the reading of online news and website helps me find interesting topics and 
available data sources. Consequently, my essays aim to make theoretical contributions to 
the existing literature of Information Systems and Economics. Essay 1 extends the theory 
of philanthropic behavior by examining the effectiveness of matching subsidies on crowd-
funding activities. Essay 2 makes theoretical contributions to better understand herding 






4.2. Data Collection and Technical Skills 
Interesting research topics may not be feasible to study due to the lack of data sources. 
Nevertheless, the rich and available transaction data from crowdfunding platforms enables 
us to overcome the challenge. The transaction data sets in essay 1 and essay 2 are crawled 
from the API of Kiva. In fact, Kiva API does not provide comprehensive transaction-level 
data. Instead, it only provides the most recent 100 transactions updated every few seconds. 
We overcome the challenge by designing a web crawler to collect the most recent 100 
transactions every 30 seconds, which help us get almost all of the transactions that occurred 
on the Kiva platform. The web crawler was initiated on 20 August 2018 and ran till 25 
December 2019, which help us collect more than 99.9% transaction data and enable us to 
conduct the research in prosocial crowdfunding.  
The collected data is a large size and unstructured data set. The characteristics of un-
structured big data require us to use sophisticated technical skills to construct the data set 
before estimation. The bid data framework, such as Rspark, is used to reorganize the data. 
Python and C++ codes are used to boost computation and generate appropriate variables 
to make estimations. These technical skills enable us to conduct research in prosocial 
crowdfunding.  
The well-organized data set is still not ideal due to the missing data problem. In Essay 
1, there is no dyadic data to explore the driving force of funders’ funding decisions. We 
use the potential dyadic method to generate the available dyadic data to perform the model 
estimation. There are no ideal data set in real empirical studies, which require us to use 






4.3. Empirical Methodology  
Another challenge in empirical research is the model specification, referring to the 
choice of appropriate function form of the model and variables. The misspecification of 
statistical models may cause biased coefficients and error terms, leading to biased param-
eter estimations. The model specification depends on the nature of the data and theoretical 
foundations. The comprehensive knowledge in statistics and economic theory, as well as 
the practical experience, help us overcome the challenge of model specification.  
In my first two years of Ph.D. course work, the courses of Econometrics and Time 
Series help me build deep and solid methodology foundations in business empirical re-
search. The continuous self-learning of statistical models and estimation methods, includ-
ing count regression models and panel regression models, enables me to find the most ap-
propriate models and estimation methods for different data sets.  
In Essay 1 and Essay 2, the endogeneity of the estimation model is also challenging. 
The selection of loans receiving matching subsidies is not a random choice, which may 
lead to the endogeneity of selection bias.  To address the endogeneity, we use the propen-
sity score matching method to generate the balanced sampled data. In the empirical analysis, 
we need to find the most suitable model specification for different data sets.  
 
4.4. Writing and Communication  
Writing and communication skills are the essential tools to help Ph.D. students make 
academic progress, publish papers in conferences and journals, and make academic contri-
butions. As a business scientist, we need not only to identify the most interesting and solid 





help of my advisor Zhiling Guo and Professor Robert J. Kauffman, my writing skills have 
improved significantly in recent years.  The improvement of writing skills enables me to 
share my academic progress and findings with my advisor more efficiently, which helps 
me receive more suggestions to improve my research.  
Presentation in the conference is always the most efficient way to share the research 
with colleagues and receive feedback to improve the paper and help it publish in journals. 
Essay 1 has been presented in the 2019 Statistical Conference in E-Commerce Research 
(SCECR) and the 2019 Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS). Many 
of the feedback and comments received from SCECR reviewers, attendees, and many other 
academic researchers will be incorporated into the study for journal submission.  
Finally, communication and relationship management are always the cornerstones of 
a successful business researcher. My research experience has given me a better understand-
ing of communication and relationship management. Firstly, I learn that keeping close con-
tact with my advisor enable me to progress the research efficiently. Discussing the aca-
demic findings with my advisor helps me learn more about the theoretical foundation of 
my research. Secondly, communicating with other Ph.D. students, especially other senior 
Ph.D. students and computer science students, helps me address the technical and method-
ology challenges.  
 
4.5. Challenges of Working with Data Sponsors  
It would be desirable if researchers can collaborate with industry data sponsors, con-
duct field experiments, and provide managerial insights. However, working with compa-





the data sponsored by a financial telecommunication institution. The institution provided 
us with monthly bilateral payment-related messaging data for non-financial market pay-
ments for 200 countries from 2004 to 2015, representing 20,000 country-pairs. I have used 
the data to identify anomalies in bilateral cross-border payment flows and built an explan-
atory econometric model to interpret the occurrence and magnitude of anomalies. 
The study finds that countries with more stable and resilient forms of governance are 
less likely to exhibit payment anomalies when there are various kinds of shocks, while 
countries with more trade openness are more likely to exhibit anomalies. These findings 
are consistent with economic resilience and vulnerability theory, providing policy insight 
that trade openness and governance level of government play a pivotal role in determining 
the economic and payment stability. Furthermore, the essay suggests building the Early 
Warning Systems for international trade and economic activity using the anomaly detection 
methods in payment flows. 
We have presented the work at the Statistical Conference in E-Commerce Research 
(SCECR), and the outcome of the project was an industry research report in the year 2018.  
However, due to the non-disclosure agreement, details of the research findings were not 
permitted to be included in the dissertation. Although the research has significant academic 
value, unfortunately, it cannot be finally published in academic journals. I learned the dif-









Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The development of information technology transforms prosocial fundraising through 
crowdfunding platforms, which enables individual funders to contribute to campaigns that 
raise funds for small entrepreneurs, by and large, from developing countries. To facilitate 
fundraising activities, matching subsidies are widely provided on crowdfunding platforms. 
However, the effects of matching subsidies on prosocial fundraising in the crowdfunding 
context are still ambiguous.  
Motivated by this research gap, I examine the effectiveness of matching subsidies on 
the crowdfunding platforms and identify positive effects of matching subsidies on both 
matched loans and unmatched loans, which alleviate the concern of the uncertain effects 
of matching subsidies on unmatched campaigns in traditional offline donations. 
Additionally, I examine how the effects of matching subsidies on boosting fundraising vary 
in different stages of a campaign, which depend on the cumulative prior contribution and 
completed percentage of the funding goal. These findings help Kiva identify the most 
effective promotion strategy of matching subsidies on its platform.  
The first essay contributes to our overall understanding of the effect of matching 
subsidies on philanthropic behavior in the crowdfunding context. There are competing 
theories about the effect of matching subsidies on private contributions in the traditional 
donation environment. The relative price theory suggests that matching subsidies increase 
the private contribution by reducing the cost of contribution, while the motivational 
crowding out theory suggests that matching subsidies have a detrimental effect on the 
intrinsic motivation of prosocial behavior, leading to decreased levels of the private 





matched loans by attracting a larger pool of lenders, which provides evidence to support 
the theory of relative price in the crowdfunding context. Additionally, we find that 
matching subsidies have positive spillover effects on unmatched loans temporarily. Our 
work provides management insight for running one-for-one matching campaigns on the 
crowdfunding platforms. Our findings support the wide usage of matching subsidies on 
crowdfunding platforms and demonstrate its effectiveness in increasing the private 
contributions to both matched and unmatched loans.  
The second essay contributes to the theory of herding behavior and payoff externalities 
by investigating how matching subsidies affect the dynamics of crowdfunding. First, we 
find that the higher accumulative prior contributions and completed percentage of the 
funding goal are both associated with higher subsequent funding, which supports the 
theories of herding behavior and payoff externalities in the prosocial crowdfunding context. 
We also find that matching subsidies moderate the herding behavior and payoff 
externalities by providing signals of quality and reducing the uncertainty of loans. Our 
work also provides policy insights about how to use matching subsidies to boost funding 
activity more efficiently. The analysis of the effect of matching subsidies in different stages 
of funding suggests that matching subsidies are most efficient in the early stages of funding. 
However, the matching subsidies have no influence on total private contribution when the 
loan is close to reaching the target goal. Consequently, we recommend providing matching 
subsidies only in the first stage of funding, which helps use the matching grants more 
efficiently. For example, prosocial crowdfunding platforms can cooperate with third-party 
institutions to provide matching subsidies when the goal attainment level has not reached 





2002) to help the funding amount reach a certain goal attainment level quickly.  
There are some limitations and future research directions. In the first essay, the data 
limitation prevents us from assessing the long term effect of matching subsidies since our 
data set only has 14 days and 5 days after the match day. In the second essay, there could 
be alternative ways to model dynamics. For example, Kim et al. (2020) model the 
crowdfunding dynamics with the variation of time lapse. My future research will extend 
the two essays. I will expand my research on the long term effect of matching subsidies in 
crowdfunding platforms by collecting more transaction data with a longer time horizon. In 
addition, I am planning to explore how social media, google search trends, and team 
endorsement in the crowdfunding context help spread the information of matching 
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Table A1: The Matching Preference of Matching Funds Providers 




Anonymous Supporter 1112 No Agricultural, Food No No 
Women and Girls Empowered 419 El Salvador, Honduras No Single Female 
Google 41 United States No Single No 
Woods Family Foundation 145 No Agricultural, Food No No 
Bank of America 257 No Agricultural, Food No Female 
Miller Family Foundation 194 Kenya, Tanzania Personal Use No No 
Anonymous Supporter 5 Cambodia Personal Use Group No 
Google 4 United States No Single No 
Diller-von Furstenberg Family 
Foundation 2 United States Retail, Service Single No 
Milwaukee 7 / MUSIC 1 United States Retail Single Female 
TRF 30 No No No No 
VMware 30 No Health No No 
VMware 15 Vietnam Housing No No 
Pepsi 21 No Agriculture No No 
Vmware 29 No Food No No 
Note: Some institutions have multiple accounts to provide matching funds for different loans.  
 
Note: On 12 September 2018, 15 third-party institutions or funders are providing matching subsidies for 1994 
loans. After discussing with staffs in Kiva, we learn that these third-party funders select matched loans based 
on several different criteria: the target amount of the loan, the number of months over which the borrower 
will repay the loan, whether the number of borrowers is larger than 1, whether the borrower of the loan is 
female, the country of that loan, the sector of that loan. These characteristics are all important criteria to 
determine whether the loan will be matched. In Table A1, we present the preference of different matching 
funds providers in multiple categorical criteria. We present the number of loans the institutions have provided 
matching subsidies (#Loans). An institution may select loans from multiple countries or sectors to provide 
matching subsidies. We list the preferred countries of an institution (Country) if the number of selected loans 
from the top two countries accounts for more than 50% of the total number of selected loans. We also list the 
preferred sectors of an institution (Sector) if the number of selected loans from the top two sectors accounts 
for more than 50% of the total number of selected loans. We also list the preference of single borrower or 
group borrowers for an institution (Group). The preference of a single borrower means that the institution 
only matches loans with a single borrower, while the preference of group borrowers means that the institution 
only match loans with more than one borrower. Finally, we list the preference of gender for an institution 















Note: The histogram of propensity scores is presented in Table B1. The horizontal axis represents the pro-
pensity score, while the vertical axis represents the density of propensity scores. From figure B1a and figure 
B1b, the propensity score of treated loans and control loans have different distributions before matching. 
Nevertheless, the propensity scores of treated loans and control loans have similar distributions after the 









APPENDIX B. An Economic Analysis of Matching Subsidies on the Dynamics of 
Crowdfunding 
 





AccumAmount  0.2***(0) 2.72 
Percent  3.62***(0.02) 2.38 
Match 2.1***(0.02) 1.06 
Competition  -0.18***(0) 1.17 
DayLapsed -0.6***(0) 1.21 
GTrends 0.25***(0.01) 1.01 
Observations 612,088  
Adjusted R-Square 0.343  
Note: The table reports the estimation results of the variance inflation factor. 
Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10.  
 
 
Note: The table presents the multicollinearity check result of the variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF test 
is the most popular method to conduct a multicollinearity check. To get the VIF value of an independent 
variable Xi, we at first regress the variable on all other independent variables and get the R-square 𝑅𝑖
2. The 
variance inflation factor value of variable Xi equals 1/(1-𝑅𝑖
2). Following the process, we get the VIF value 























APPENDIX C. An Economic Analysis of Matching Subsidies on the Dynamics of 
Crowdfunding with Alternative Data Set from January 4, 2019, to March 5, 2019. 
 
 
Table C3. Descriptive Statistics 
N=612,088 MIN MAX MEAN SD 
FundAmount 0 27900 53.03 222.42 
AccumAmount 0 40625 122.16 403.38 
Percent  0 1 0.09 0.17 
Match 0 1 0.01 0.09 
Competition 1 1098 198.51 272.98 
DayLapsed 1 46 12.63 9.02 
GTrends 16 100 78.56 16 
Note: The table presents the statistics of variables generated from the data set 
starting from January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019.  
 
Table C4. Variables Correlation 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FundAmount 1       
AccumAmount 0.3 1      
Percent  0.2 0.59 1     
Match 0.06 0.11 0.09 1    
Competition -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 1   
DayLapsed -0.04 0.13 0.18 -0.03 0.01 1  
GTrends 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.22 -0.03 1 
Note: The table presents the correlation of variables generated from the data set 
starting from January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. 
 





AccumAmount  0.23***(0) 2.86 
Percent  3.77***(0.02) 2.52 
Match 1.87***(0.03) 1.02 
Competition  -0.12***(0) 1.16 
DayLapsed -0.58***(0) 1.13 
GTrends 0.23***(0.02) 1.02 
Observations 445,368  
Adjusted R-Square 0.341  
Note: The table reports the estimation results of the variance inflation factor using 
the data set from January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. Standard Errors are provided 















 CTRL TREAT SMD CTRL TREAT SMD 
Count 39239 2990  1415 1467  
LoanAmount 794.90 1169.46 0.26 1218.34 951.96 0.08 
RepayTerm 13.35 14.86 0.23 13.10 13.33 0.03 
IsGroup 0.12 0.25 0.06 0.21 0.19 0.06 
IsFemale 0.75 0.83 0.20 0.80 0.79 0.02 
Country NA NA 1.24 NA NA 0.21 
Sector NA NA 0.26 NA NA 0.09 
Note: The table presents the propensity score matching results using the 
data set starting from January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. The Treat column 
presents the mean of variables for loans receiving matching subsidies. The 
Ctrl column presents the mean of variables for loans without receiving 
matching subsidies. The standardized mean deviation (SMD) is widely used 
in literature to measure the balance of variables between treated groups and 
control groups. 
 













The table presents the estimation results using the data set starting from 
January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. The data set is also sampled with 
the propensity score matching procedure.The standard errors are 0 be-
cause they are less than 0.01. The estimation is implemented with the 
negative binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects. 
The estimation drops all of the loans with all zero outcomes and only 
one observation per loan.  


















AccumAmount 0.23***(0) 0.19***(0.01) 
Percent 2.98***(0.05) 3.7***(0.13) 
Match 3.23***(0.05) 2.99***(0.07) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.17***(0.02) -0.17***(0.03) 
Match*Percent -2.79***(0.16) -3.5***(0.26) 
Competition -0.2***(0.02) -0.4***(0.05) 
DayLapsed 0.03***(0) -0.08***(0.01) 
GTrends 0.22***(0.03) 0.11(0.09) 
Observations 445,368 43,708 
Adjusted R-Square 0.27 0.354 
The estimation is implemented with the fixed effects model controlling the loan fixed ef-
fects, using the data set starting from January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. The first column 
presents the estimation of fixed effects model using the full sample data. The second col-
umn presents the estimation of fixed effects model using the sampled data selected from 
propensity score matching procedure.  
Note: Robust Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10. 
The standard errors are 0 because they are less than 0.01.  
 
 






AccumFunder  0.85***(0)  
ContrFreq  0.45***(0) 
Percent  0.93***(0.02) 1.74***(0.02) 
Match 2.2***(0.03) 2.6***(0.03) 
Match* AccumFunder -0.5***(0.02)  
Match* 
ContrFreq  -0.5***(0.02) 
Match*Percent -0.57***(0.1) -0.59***(0.08) 
Competition  -0.11***(0) -0.17***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.46***(0) -0.18***(0) 
GTrends 0.35***(0.02) 0.4***(0.02) 
Observations 397,209 397,209 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using 
AccumFunder and ContrFreq as alternative measures of herding momen-
tum. The estimation is implemented with the negative binomial model con-
trolling the loan-specific fixed effects, using the data set starting from Jan-
uary 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. The estimation drops all of the groups (loans) 
with all zero outcomes and only one observation per group. 


















AccumAmount  0.41***(0) 0.4***(0) 
Percent  1.37***(0.02) 1.27***(0.02) 
Match 2.07***(0.05) 2.04***(0.04) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.23***(0.02) -0.27***(0.02) 
Match*Percent -0.59***(0.11) -0.46***(0.1) 
Competition  -0.15***(0) -0.15***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.51***(0) -0.49***(0) 
GTrends 0.33***(0.03) 0.29***(0.03) 
Observations 283,854 270,521 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using 
groups (loans) with more than $500 funded amount and loans with com-
plete funding history. The estimation is implemented with the negative 
binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects, using the data 
set starting from January 4 2019 to March 5, 2019. The estimation drops 
all of the groups with all zero outcomes and only one observation per 
group. 

























APPENDIX D. An Economic Analysis of Matching Subsidies on the Dynamics of 
Crowdfunding with Alternative Data Set from June 4 2019 to August 23, 2019. 
 
Table D5. Descriptive Statistics 
N=612,088 MIN MAX MEAN SD 
FundAmount 0 42175 56.98814 260.0447 
AccumAmount 0 92000 138.5644 718.2864 
Percent  0 0.9995 0.1100552 0.1748891 
Match 0 1 0.0269171 0.1618413 
Competition 1 1362 184.4594 261.7525 
DayLapsed 1 101 13.53027 10.65891 
GTrends 6 100 68.84944 20.02522 
Note: The table presents the statistics of variables generated from the data set 
starts from June 4 2019 to August 23, 2019. 
 
Table D6. Variables Correlation 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FundAmount 1       
AccumAmount 0.29 1      
Percent  0.15 0.35 1     
Match 0.11 0.06 0.12 1    
Competition -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.03 1   
DayLapsed -0.05 0.06 0.15 -0.03 0.03 1  
GTrends -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 1 
Note: The table presents the correlation of variables generated from the data set 
starts from June 4 2019 to August 23, 2019. 
 





AccumAmount  0.18***(0) 2.58 
Percent  3.65***(0.02) 2.26 
Match 2.2***(0.01) 1.03 
Competition  -0.14***(0) 1.17 
DayLapsed -0.6***(0) 1.12 
GTrends -0.05***(0.01) 1.01 
Observations   556,858  
Adjusted R-Square 0.329  
Note: The table reports the estimation results of the variance inflation factor. 













 CTRL TREAT SMD CTRL TREAT SMD 
Count 42567 10308  4647 5375  
LoanAmount 786.58 1074.91 0.19 969.88 981.28 0.01 
RepayTerm 13.60 13.60 0.01 13.44 13.39 0.01 
IsGroup 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.02 
IsFemale 0.78 0.79 0.02 0.79 0.79 0.01 
Country NA NA 0.96 NA NA 0.21 
Sector NA NA 0.41 NA NA 0.06 
Note: The table presents the propensity score matching results using the 
data set starting from June 4 2019 to August 23 2019. The Treat column 
presents the mean of variables for loans receiving matching subsidies. The 
Ctrl column presents the mean of variables for loans without receiving 
matching subsidies. The standardized mean deviation (SMD) is widely used 
in literature to measure the balance of variables between treated groups and 
control groups. 
 













The table presents the estimation results using the data set starting from 
June 4 2019 to August 23 2019. The data set is also sampled with 
the propensity score matching procedure. The standard errors are 0 be-
cause they are less than 0.01. The estimation is implemented with the 
negative binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects. 
The estimation drops all of the loans with all zero outcomes and only 
one observation per loan.  





















AccumAmount 0.2***(0) 0.16***(0.01) 
Percent 3.03***(0.04) 3.87***(0.07) 
Match 3.38***(0.03) 2.83***(0.04) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.12***(0.01) -0.05***(0.02) 
Match*Percent -3.1***(0.1) -3.72***(0.14) 
Competition -0.24***(0.01) -0.37***(0.03) 
DayLapsed -0.01**(0) -0.09***(0.01) 
GTrends 0.34***(0.02) 0.23***(0.05) 
Observations 556,858 135,318 
Adjusted R-Square 0.26 0.332 
The estimation is implemented with the fixed effects model controlling the loan fixed 
effects, using the data set starting from June 4 2019 to August 23, 2019. The first col-
umn presents the estimation of the fixed effects model using the full sample data. The 
second column presents the estimation of the fixed effects model using the sampled 
data selected from the propensity score matching procedure.  
Note: Robust Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. 










AccumFunder  0.8***(0)  
ContrFreq  0.39***(0) 
Percent  1.08***(0.02) 1.96***(0.02) 
Match 2.21***(0.01) 2.62***(0.02) 
Match* AccumFunder -0.46***(0.01)  
Match* 
ContrFreq  -0.5***(0.01) 
Match*Percent -0.75***(0.05) -0.64***(0.04) 
Competition  -0.14***(0) -0.19***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.47***(0) -0.2***(0) 
GTrends 0.06***(0.01) -0.01(0.01) 
Observations 517,024 517,024 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using 
AccumFunder and ContrFreq as alternative measures of herding momen-
tum. The estimation is implemented with the negative binomial model con-
trolling the loan-specific fixed effects, using the data set starting from June 
4 2019 to August 23, 2019. The estimation drops all of the groups (loans) 
with all zero outcomes and only one observation per group. 
















AccumAmount  0.36***(0) 0.33***(0) 
Percent  1.67***(0.02) 1.62***(0.02) 
Match 2.17***(0.02) 1.89***(0.02) 
Match* AccumAmount -0.19***(0.01) -0.15***(0.01) 
Match*Percent -1.14***(0.06) -1.09***(0.06) 
Competition  -0.19***(0) -0.17***(0) 
DayLapsed -0.46***(0) -0.45***(0) 
GTrends -0.01(0.01) -0.07***(0.02) 
Observations 395,486 364,125 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of robustness checks using 
groups (loans) with more than $500 funded amount and loans with com-
plete funding history. The estimation is implemented with the negative 
binomial model controlling the loan-specific fixed effects, using the data 
set starting from June 4 2019 to August 23, 2019. The estimation drops 
all of the groups with all zero outcomes and only one observation per 
group. 
Standard Errors are provided in parentheses. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10.  
 
 
 
